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ABSTRACT 
Due to the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program, the 
Marine Corps have begun developing the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to 
replace the 42-year-old Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV). Because the ACV will 
not be fielded until 2022, the AAV is being modified to improve its survivability. 
Upgrades to the AAV will make it heavier and, therefore, will make it sink faster. 
This thesis explores the factors that give Marines the best chance for surviving a 
sinking AAV. A 2 (17 vs. 21 embarked infantry) x 2 (daylight vs. restricted 
lighting) x 3 (combinations of armor and floatation devices) x 6 (combinations of 
egress or evacuation and number of hatches) full factorial experiment was 
conducted at Camp Pendleton, CA, in August 2012. An analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) identified specific factor combinations that yielded the lowest egress 
times. Specifically, subjects who left their weapons and body armor and exited 
through the two rear cargo hatches had the best chance of survival. This thesis 
provides baseline results for future emergency egress studies on the AAV and 
the new ACV. 
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Due to the discontinuation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Marine 
Corps is studying a new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to replace the 42-
year-old Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV). The ACV is projected to enter service 
in 2022 with full implementation occurring by 2030. In the interim, the AAV will 
remain the Marine Corps' forcible entry platform with survivability upgrades 
designed to extend its use until the ACV's implementation. While the Marine 
Corps is assessing various components of the legacy AAV, this thesis assessed 
the emergency egress time and associated standard operating procedures. 
Future modifications may alter the buoyancy characteristics significantly, 
changing the way the AAV sinks and thus the way Marines must egress. To 
provide a point of reference for the modified AAV and the future ACV, we 
established benchmark egress and evacuation times.  
In August 2012, we performed a full factorial experiment at Amphibious 
Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) in Camp Pendleton, CA. Our experiment subjected 
infantry to 216 time trials with variables that included 17 vs. 21 embarked 
infantry, daylight vs. restricted light conditions, three combinations of armor and 
personal flotation device, and six routes of egress or evacuation. Additionally, we 
measured each Marine and analyzed the anthropometric data to ensure that our 
subjects were a representative sample of the Marine Corps infantry population. 
At the conclusion of the experimentation, we surveyed each Marine to gain 
additional insight. 
We used analysis of variance (ANOVA) and descriptive statistics to 
identify specific factor combinations that yielded the lowest egress times. 
Subjects egressed from the AAV with an average time of 1:39 (98.78 seconds) 
and a median time of 1:17 (76.6 seconds). The range was 0:29 (28.7 seconds) to 
6:10 (370 seconds) with a standard deviation of 1:01 (61.41 seconds). When 
subjects had the ability to egress through all available hatches, their egress times 
 xviii
decreased significantly. In fact, the most significant factor in decreasing egress 
times is the route.  
Further, when subjects dropped their weapons and body armor, egress 
times reduced dramatically; this was especially true when the route combination 
forced the subjects through the forward hatches only. Daylight and 17-subject 
configurations also had some minor effects on reducing the group's time. The 
LPU-41/SRU-43 HESP, while having a unique emergency air canister, created 
more snags and limited each subject's ability to egress, especially subjects who 
fell in the 95th percentile for several anthropometrics. Unlike the older LPU-32, 
the HESP did not fit underneath the subjects' armor; therefore, it prevented 
subjects from shedding their gear during egress or evacuation. 
The research revealed that the vehicle commander would benefit from an 
SOP that is more permissive. In the event of a slow sink, the situation may 
quickly deteriorate into a rapid sink. The vehicle commander should be able to 
make the call to remove gear at any time to save the lives of Marines.  
If buoyancy characteristics change the manner in which an AAV sinks, 
then three recommendations remain. First, ensuring all potential routes are 
operable in the event of an emergency egress will ensure maximum survivability 
of the entire crew and all passengers. Second, use of a personal flotation device 
that does not restrict the removal of body armor will reduce snags and blockages. 
Third, survival during waterborne operations requires realistic training, simple 
instructions, and up-to-date procedures. Developing a doctrine that captures the 
institutional knowledge of the Marine Corps would serve to enhance training and 
to reduce potential incidents related to emergency egress. This thesis provides 
baseline data for future emergency egress studies on the AAV and the new ACV. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States Marine Corps has projected forces ashore in the form 
of amphibious landings for the last 237 years. The Marine Corps has a rich 
history of being “soldiers from the sea,” especially when it comes to amphibious 
operations. From the Raid of Nassau (Hoffman, 2002) to the demonstration 
during the Persian Gulf War (Hayden, 1995), Marines have built a remarkable 
reputation accomplishing the mission that defines their very name. Despite the 
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps is determined to eliminate the 
notion of being a “second land army” and get back to its maritime roots (Amos, 
2011). With increased U.S. emphasis on the Pacific Theater of Operations 
(Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012), the Marine Corps sees its current doctrine, 
training and equipment, with respect to its premier core competency, as 
insufficient.  
The AAV Egress Study focuses on the emergency egress from an AAV for 
a full complement of subjects. The study uses experimentation and quantitative 
analysis to address proposed equipment modifications and modify operating 
procedures. The analysis yields the importance of each factor relative to the 
process of egress. It also exposes which levels of those factors contribute to 
increased or decreased overall egress time. Shifting focus towards the Pacific, 
many nations look to reinforce their littoral regions with anti-access/area denial 
(A2/AD) measures. A2/AD is a state’s ability to control its cyber and physical 
space while denying potential adversaries access to that same space (Defense 
Strategic Guidance, 2012). Advancing A2/AD capabilities require the United 
States to remain in the lead with regard to forcible entry. Forcible entry into the 
littoral regions requires the ability to conduct opposed amphibious landings. The 
nation’s first choice for opposed amphibious landings is the Navy-Marine Corps 
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team, and the Marine Corps’ tool of choice is the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
(AAV).  
For the past 42 years, the AAV has been the workhorse of Marine Corps’ 
amphibious operations. The AAV was scheduled for replacement by the 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) but Congress canceled the EFV program at 
the beginning of 2011 at the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 
Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos. The Amphibious 
Combat Vehicle (ACV) is now scheduled to replace the AAV but has a projected 
operational timeframe between FY2020 and FY2022. This makes the already 
overworked AAV the stopgap system for the near future.  
To meet immediate operational requirements, the Marine Corps decided 
the AAV must undergo a survivability upgrade. Although specifics have not been 
fully determined to date, the upgrade is expected to improve the performance of 
the AAV on both land and water. This increased performance will undoubtedly 
lead to a change in the characteristics of the AAV’s reserve buoyancy and overall 
waterborne attributes. These changes will, in turn, alter the survivability of 
subjects attempting to egress from a sinking AAV. For decision makers to assess 
risk appropriately, a current survivability baseline needs to be established. 
This study analyzes time trials conducted at Camp Pendleton in August 
2012 to establish the time it takes the subjects of a fully loaded AAV (17 or 21 
combat-loaded infantry plus three crewmen) to egress under various conditions 
and scenarios. Additionally, the statistical analysis of egress data will inform 
revisions of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) and increase the 
probability of survival. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
In August of 2011, a System Evaluation Operational Planning Team (SE-
OPT) convened to address the “road ahead” for the AAV and future systems (H. 
Oldland, personal communication, 25 April 2013). The SE-OPT produced several 
initiatives, one of which was a statement of work (SOW) that outlined the need to 
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conduct an egress study. The SOW described several factors and two different 
sink scenarios for testing. The egress study’s primary objectives were as follows 
(SOW, 2011): 
 Establish the time it takes for 17 or 21 embarked Infantry and crew 
to egress during a rapid sink scenario; and 
 Establish the time it takes for 17 or 21 embarked Infantry and crew 
to egress during a slow sink or disabled vehicle scenario.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The SOW’s developers sought data that would quantify emergency egress 
from a sinking AAV. These data would be used in equipment and SOP 
modification process. The following research questions were derived from the 
SOW and provided focus for the experimental design, data collection, and 
subsequent analysis:  
1. What factors provide subjects in a sinking AAV the best chance for 
survival?  
2. Is the design of experiment appropriate given the safety 
constraints?  
3. Does the current SOP establish the optimal settings for maximum 
survivability of an embarked crew and subject load during 
waterborne operations? 
D. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
On 13 January 2011, Sergeant Wesley Rice drowned in a sinking AAV. 
The accident occurred while conducting a training exercise in the Del Mar boat 
basin at Camp Pendleton, California (Kovach, 2011). The event was reminiscent 
of a similar accident that resulted in a fatality in 1994. During the more recent 
accident, the vehicle entered the water with all three crew hatches open and the 
bow plane in the down position. When the vehicle sped up, the nose sank, which 
allowed water to flow into the crew hatches and pinned the crewmen inside. 
However, because the cargo hatches remained secured, the subjects in the back 
remained unaware of the impending danger. The vehicle commander ordered 
 4
Sergeant Rice (the third crewman in the back) and the other two subjects to 
engage the fuel shut-off valve and prepare to evacuate. The crew chief then 
swam to the surface. The other two subjects evacuated while Sergeant Rice 
tended to the shut-off valve. At some point, Sergeant Rice suffered a head injury 
and was unable to escape. Of the five subjects who sank with the AAV during 
this training exercise, only four were able to swim to the surface (J. Accord, 
personal communication, 6 August 2012). Setting aside the obvious errors in 
procedure, the accident illustrates the dynamic nature and inherent danger 
associated with waterborne movement in an AAV. 
The AAV is the primary tool to gain access into an opposed coastal region 
where the enemy has the advantage of terrain and is employing mines and direct 
fire weapon systems. Under such conditions, the possibility of sinking with a full 
complement of Marines in the back of an AAV becomes eerily plausible. 
Therefore, it is important for decision makers to know what factors could prevent 
those Marines from drowning. However, it is extremely difficult to determine with 
precision what factors affect egress from a sinking AAV because of the inherent 
complexities in such circumstances.  
It is well noted that accidents are generally the result of situations 
that a given system is not able to handle…emergency situations 
can create interactive conditions that have not been fully predicted 
nor modeled. Problems increase dramatically when the 
environment becomes toxic from fire and smoke. In sum, there is 
potentially no end to the complexity that [a vehicle] accident might 
embody, and consequently, no end to the number or quality of 
interactions that can be imagined to exist in these scenarios. 
(McLean, 2001, p. 1)  
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is “the study of those variables that 
influence the efficiency with which the human performer can interact with the 
inanimate components of a system to accomplish the system goals” (Proctor & 
Van Zandt, 2008, p. 10). Although there is an obvious human system interaction 
taking place in all phases of AAV operation, this study is concerned with human 
performance when the vehicle begins to sink. Specifically, the system is the 
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sinking AAV, and the desired human performance is the safe egress of every 
subject. There are several methods used to measure human factors. This study 
uses descriptive and experimental methods.  
Descriptive methods involve analyzing situations in their natural or real-
world setting. The strength of this method is that the “concern of human factors is 
the operation system, which by its nature is complex and not subject to precisely 
controlled investigation” (Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008, p. 33). This poses several 
significant problems for the egress study. Due to safety concerns, floating an 
AAV in the water and conducting egress experiments places the test subjects at 
considerable risk and creates a significant logistical burden when trying to 
perform multiple trials.  
Two critical considerations exist when using experimental methods: 
internal validity and ecological validity. Internal validity exists when the outcome 
of an experiment can be repeated. However, the strict control of laboratory 
experiments can have a “dilution effect,” causing low ecological validity (Proctor 
& Van Zandt, 2008, pp. 33, 38). This is not to say that experimental methods are 
not useful. “… [F]actorial studies implemented to illuminate the contributions to 
system function or an individual factor(s) and the interactions it produces with 
another factor(s) provide a basis for understanding the total system and its 
functions” (McLean, 2001, p. 2). 
This egress study stayed within the limitations of safety, and therefore, 
relied on a combination of descriptive and experimental methods to draw its 
conclusions. The use of a full factorial design ensured systematic study of the 
relevant system characteristics. “Factorial experimentation is highly efficient, 
because every observation supplies information about all the factors included in 
the experiment” (Snedecor & Cochran, 1967, p. 339). 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter I provides a brief introduction 
and overview. Chapter II is a literature review with a brief history of Marine Corps 
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amphibious operations, the lineage of the AAV and the “road ahead.” 
Additionally, this chapter looks at several relevant studies that provide insight into 
the way to conduct an egress study and concludes with research hypotheses. 
Chapter III describes the methods utilized in the experiment and the operational 
planning necessary to coordinate the event. Chapter IV describes the 
quantitative data analysis conducted after the experiment. Chapter V discusses 
the results as they relate to the research questions. Chapter VI provides a 
conclusion and recommendations for future work.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The literature review in this chapter consists of three distinct sections. The 
first section presents a brief history of Marine Corps amphibious operations and 
provides a detailed discussion about current geo-political relevance. The second 
section reviews the current status of the AAV program and the challenges 
associated with fielding a replacement. The third section reviews studies related 
to the field of emergency egress and describes the hypotheses used for the AAV 
Egress Study.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The Background section gives a brief history of Marine Corps amphibious 
operations and provides a detailed discussion about current geo-political 
relevance. 
1. History of Amphibious Operations 
The Marine Corps has been projecting forces ashore in the form of 
amphibious landings for the last 237 years. On 3 March 1776, the Continental 
Marines, led by Captain Samuel Nicholas, landed in the Bahamas at New 
Providence Island and seized Fort Montagu (Hoffman, 2002). This was the first of 
many Navy-Marine Corps amphibious assaults on foreign controlled land. During 
the Mexican-American War, Marines once again conducted amphibious landings 
along the coast of Mexico and California. On 7 July 1846, Marines landed at 
Monterey, near the pier at Fisherman’s Wharf and declared California to be part 
of the United States (Hoffman, 2002). Gates reported the following Marine Corps 
developments during the early part of the 20th Century: 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps conducted what 
would now be called stability operations in the Caribbean, wrote the 
Small Wars Manual and at the same time developed the 
 8
amphibious landing techniques that would help liberate Europe and 
the Pacific in the following decade. (Gates, 2009, p. 7) 
In November 1943, 2nd Marine Division made an assault on the Tarawa Atoll, 
marking the first time the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) platforms were 
employed as amphibian troop carriers (Hoffman, 2002). The LVT was a family of 
vehicles used to move equipment ashore (and even became involved in some 
limited offensive engagements) as the Marines stormed the Japanese-controlled 
islands throughout the Pacific.  
On 15 September 1950, General Douglas MacArthur executed an 
amphibious landing at Incheon, South Korea, with U.S. Marines as the majority of 
his troop force. Heinl described the landing as “one of the most dramatic such 
transitions from defense to attack in the annals of war” (Heinl, 1998, p. 117). In 
the Persian Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf used the threat of a Marine 
amphibious landing to fix six Iraqi divisions to the Kuwaiti coast. The amphibious 
demonstration (or feint) was the greatest amphibious force assembled since 
Incheon and was successful in fooling and subsequently flanking the Iraqi 
divisions (Hayden, 1995). 
2. Navy-Marine Corps Team 
Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has relied heavily on its partner, 
the United States Navy. Operation Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is the 
current doctrine guiding Navy-Marine Corps amphibious operations. The doctrine 
plainly states: 
In the absence of an adjacent land base, a sustainable forcible 
entry capability that is independent of forward staging bases, 
friendly borders, overflight rights, and other politically dependent 
support can come only from the sea. (Operational Maneuver from 
the Sea, 1996, p. 3)  
There are several ways the Navy can conduct Ship to Objective Maneuver 
(STOM) for a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Utilizing amphibious 
shipping such as Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), Landing Helicopter Assault 
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(LHA) and Landing Platform Dock (LPD), the Navy can deliver Marines and 
equipment ashore with landing crafts or aerial assets. (See Appendix A for 
platform descriptions.) However, the only system capable of making a forcible 
entry on an enemy-controlled beach is the AAV. The AAV can travel two nautical 
miles in Sea State Three (see Appendix B for Sea State Tables) and conduct an 
opposed landing. However, the proliferation of cruise missiles poses a significant 
concern to large naval ships (Gates and Mullen, 2011). In the event AAVs need 
to deliver Marines, amphibious ships would be in danger within 200 nautical 
miles of an enemy-controlled shore that possessed cruise missiles or other 
A2/AD technologies.  
A discussion involving the tradeoff between the standoff distance  
the Navy requires and the range of the AAV is ongoing and will undoubtedly 
influence potential replacements for the Marine Corps’ primary amphibian 
vehicle. On 11 March 2013, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon said, “The 
strategic pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region will help to rebalance the projection 
and focus of U.S. power” (Lyle, 2013, p. 1). As the nation looks to initiate a 
“Pacific Pivot,” the U.S. will increase its naval fleet operating in the Pacific to 60% 
by 2020 (Lyle, 2013).  
Once ashore, AAVs are directed to continue to carry the infantry and work 
alongside tanks as the fight moves inland. Current AAVs and their future 
replacements will require the mobility and armor to co-exist with tanks. Marines 
at times have served to augment the Army’s occupation of a hostile territory for 
an extended period. Historic examples include Vietnam and most recently the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Although the AAV was designed to conduct amphibious landings, there 
exists a requirement to remain versatile as the conflict pushes inland or when 
Marines are augmenting conventional ground forces. Recent conflicts have 
shown an increase in non-state actors utilizing improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). Unfortunately, it is challenging to combine a hydrodynamic hull structure 
with an IED resistant design. At a minimum, the design outcome would be far 
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heavier than any current Navy transport could support, and would exceed the 
Marine Corps’ ground vehicle budget. As the war in Afghanistan continues to 
draw down, the Marine Corps has begun to consider the future of its force and 
the equipment necessary to meet future threats and missions.  
The Food Machinery Corporation (FMC) originally designed the LVT in 
1932 to perform rescue operations in swampy terrain. Donald Roebling 
(grandson of John Augustus Roebling, the builder of the Brooklyn Bridge), 
designed the LVT-1 for operations in WWII. Over the years, the LVT went 
through several versions increasing its speed, power and weaponry (Hoffman, 
2002). By the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps employed the LVT-5, FMC 
redesigned the aging LVT-5 in the 1960s. In 1967, the first pilot vehicles known 
as the LVTPX12 began the evaluation process with full operational service 
beginning in 1972 (ROC NO. MOB1.13A, 1985). It was designated the Landing 
Vehicle Tracked Personnel, Model 7 (LVTP-7) and was designed to carry a full 
complement of 25 combat-ready Marines or 10,000 lbs of cargo (ROC NO. 
MOB1.13A, 1985). The LVTP-7 underwent its first service life extension program 
(SLEP) in 1983. Re-designated in 1987 as the AAVP7A1, it received product 
improvement upgrades to lethality, survivability, and communications (PEO LS 
Industry Day Brief, 2011). Figure 1 provides a timeline from the first fielding to 
present day. 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of LVT7/AAV7 (from PEO LS, 2011) 
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From 1999 to 2007, the AAV entered the Reliability Availability and 
Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) Program. As a result of numerous 
upgrades, the embarked troop capacity decreased from 25 to 21 combat-loaded 
Marines (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-13, 2005). (See Appendix C for 
dimensions.) Over the years, improvements in the engine, suspension and armor 
made the AAV heavier and increased its nose-first sink characteristic. The 
increased size of the engine encroached into the troop compartment. 
Additionally, the average Marine has grown over the years from 160 lbs to  
178 lbs (Corner & Gordon, 2008), and the personal body armor equipment 
weighs 88 lbs (Broadbent et al., 2009). The reduction in space combined with the 
increases in weight per subject directly affected the doctrinal troop capacity of the 
AAV over the years (K. Moore, personal communication, 11 May 2013). 
In 2011, a portion of the AAV fleet received communications and 
survivability upgrades costing $1.7M per vehicle (Oldland, 2013). Since the EFV 
program’s cancellation, the percentage of the AAV fleet to undergo the upgrade 
has been increased. The main effort for the current upgrade is on survivability for 
the crew and improvements to water and land performance. Several of the 
proposed survivability upgrades include underbelly protection, armor protection, 
spall liner and blast attenuating seats. An updated command, control and 
communications (C3) system is also being added, along with an improved 
propulsion system and transmission in order to move the heavier version faster 
both on land and in the water (PEO LS, 2011). 
C. Present Situation 
The Present Situation section reviews the current status of the AAV 
program and the challenges associated with fielding a replacement. 
1. Equipment Conflicts 
In January 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates and Marine Corps 
Commandant General Amos recommended that Congress cancel the EFV 
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program. In the same speech, Secretary Gates reaffirmed the Marine Corps 
would retain the mission of amphibious landings.  
This decision does not call into question the Marines' amphibious 
assault mission. We will budget the funds necessary to develop a 
more affordable and sustainable amphibious tractor to provide the 
Marines a ship-to-shore capability into the future. The budget will 
also propose funds to upgrade the existing amphibious vehicle fleet 
with new engines, electronics and armaments to ensure that the 
Marines will be able to conduct ship-to-shore missions until the next 
generation of systems is brought online. (Gates & Mullen, 2011) 
Leading up to the cancellation, the General Dynamics Corporation, the 
EFV lead contractor, had gone over budget and was eight years behind 
schedule. By then, General Dynamics needed $3.5 billion, in addition to the 
$8.5 billion already spent, and several more years to complete just 573 EFVs. 
This figure was a nearly 50% reduction from the original 1,025 EFVs ordered. 
Further, the EFV design did not include the V-shaped hull that recent mine 
resistant vehicles use to lessen the blast impact from IEDs (Feickert, 2011). An 
IED resistant hull structure would have made the vehicle even heavier and more 
expensive. Secretary Gates, understanding the rising cost of the EFV compared 
to the Marine Corps’ total ground vehicle budget, decided to terminate the 
program altogether (Feickert, 2011). 
Immediately following the cancelation of the EFV, Lieutenant General 
George Flynn, Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC), established a System Evaluation Operational Planning 
Team (SE-OPT). The purpose of the SE-OPT was to review the technology 
already developed for the EFV and determine how to leverage it in the 
procurement of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. In short, the SE-OPT, formed to 
answer the question: What went wrong with the EFV and how do we fix it for the 
next Marine Corps amphibious vehicle?  
The SE-OPT consisted exclusively of engineers within the Marine Corps; it 
was not open to industry. The discussions spanned a wide range of issues 
involving the procurement of the ACV and the stopgap upgrades necessary to 
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sustain the AAV until fiscal year 2022 (FY22). The SE-OPT drafted several 
statements of work (SOW) to investigate concerns about AAV sink rates as a 
result of the upgrades to the system. 
Two main concerns emerged from the SOWs: reserve buoyancy and 
emergency egress. Reserve buoyancy is “that part of the volume of a vessel that 
is above the water surface and is watertight” (Hoyt, 2012, p. 1). Discussion about 
the percentage of reserve buoyancy required for survivability and lethality remain 
ongoing. A technical memorandum drafted in August 2012 best described the 
relationship between reserve buoyancy and emergency egress: 
Time To Sink–A vehicle with a hull breech will take on water at a 
rate dictated by the size of the hole and its depth. If the breech 
exceeds the capacity of the bilge system, the craft will sink. The 
time from hull breech to sinking is determined by the net rate of 
water shipping onboard and the initial reserve buoyancy. As an 
example, a 2 inch diameter hole in the bottom of an AAV with 30% 
reserve buoyancy and 2 bilge pumps operating would sink in 26 
minutes, however starting with only 10% reserve buoyancy would 
sink in 5 minutes. The question is how much time is required to 
safely evacuate both the troops and crew and what level of reserve 
buoyancy allows this. (Hoyt, 2012, p. 4)  
2. The Road Ahead 
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that a mechanized 
amphibious assault capability may not be realistic in the near future of warfare for 
two reasons. First, the purpose of amphibious operations is to provide a foothold 
in the littoral regions, a responsibility easily distributed among other platforms 
already in the arsenal. For instance, modern day ship-to-shore connectors 
provide high speed and capacity lift for the bulk of the landing force through air 
and sea modes. The Air Force possesses huge airlift capabilities for rapid 
buildup of troops and equipment. The need for an armored ship-to-shore 
connector would only be required for an opposed landing. Once a beachhead is 
established, the armored vehicles secure the area while the other modes insert 
the remaining forces. Second, the rise of non-state actors conducting 
insurgencies using guerilla-style tactics requires a modular landing force. In line 
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with the previous example, after securing the beachhead, the landing force must 
be mobile and have a mine resistant capability. If that vehicle is too heavy and 
cannot withstand IEDs, it becomes a liability.  
This viewpoint led to several alternatives for how to proceed with the 
Marine Corps’ amphibious assault capability. First, General Dynamics proposed 
reducing the number of EFVs to 200 at a cost savings of $6 billion. Second, the 
Marine Corps announced an ACV program. The ACV needed to have the 
following capabilities: travel 12 miles ship-to-shore (EFV was intended to travel 
25 miles); IED resistant; carry 17 combat-loaded troops; and keep up with 
mechanized units (M1A1 Tank) once ashore (Feickert, 2013). Third, the Marine 
Corps sent requests to industry to develop a Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). 
The MPC is intended to be an inland capable vehicle that could take over for the 
ACV once ashore. The key performance parameters require the MPC to function 
across the full range of military operations but be light enough for transport by 
modern ship-to-shore connectors (PEO LS, 2011). The fourth alternative involved 
upgrading the AAV to meet mission requirements long enough for the ACV and 
MPC to enter service between FY20 and FY22 (Feickert, 2013). Currently the 
Marine Corps is looking to extend the service life of the AAV long enough to 
allow for the ACV to be developed. Additionally, research is ongoing to determine 
whether or not the MPC will be necessary. 
As the war in Afghanistan winds down, the nation looks to increase its 
presence in the Pacific Theater (Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012). The Marine 
Corps seeks to break away from being a “second land army” and get back to its 
amphibious roots (Amos, 2012). With the Marine Corps’ vehicle of choice to 
deliver landing forces ashore in transition, decision makers require the necessary 
data to make sound decisions. Upgraded versions of the AAV will be faster but 
also heavier. What will that mean for the crew and embarked infantry of an AAV 
that sinks for some unforeseen reason? Does increasing the size of the 
suspension and the power train change the buoyancy characteristics of the AAV? 
If so, will it sink faster and in what manner? 
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A 2011 presentation by the Program Executive Office for Land Systems 
(PEO LS) describes the priority of the SLEP for the AAV to be survivability (PEO 
LS, 2011). Survivability is defined as:  
[P]rotection against fratricide, detection, and instantaneous, 
cumulative, and residual nuclear, biological, and chemical effects; 
personnel survivability against asymmetric threats; the integrity of 
the crew compartment; and provisions for rapid egress when the 
system is severely damaged or destroyed. (DoD HSI Management 
Plan, 2009, p. 4-5) 
Unlike all other vehicles in the U.S. arsenal, the AAV is the only one 
required to move from ship to shore and then partner with other vehicles to 
continue the assault inland. Thus, survivability considerations for the AAV start 
when it enters the water, as opposed to when the AAV is first susceptible to 
enemy fire.  
In order to determine the extent to which physical changes in the AAV 
alter its survivability, baseline performance measures must be established. One 
such performance baseline is how quickly embarked personnel can egress a 
sinking AAV in its current configuration. Collecting egress data on subjects 
embarked on a sinking AAV is an extremely dangerous undertaking. A less risky 
initial study would be to study egress on dry land. With preplanned routes and 
procedures, such a study should yield the data needed to begin comparisons to 
the ACV and in riskier waterborne scenarios. 
Resurgence in amphibious training due to a greater emphasis on the 
Pacific Theater will lead to increased risk of waterborne incidents. Procedures for 
training personnel to operate safely in the water can ensure incidents like the one 
involving Sergeant Rice do not occur again. For example, when transporting at 
full capacity, an AAV contains 17 subjects instead of the two who were aboard 
when Sergeant Rice died. What would be the optimal escape route to ensure 
everybody survives? After Sergeant Rice’s accident, it was learned that the crew 
hatches had remained open, allowing water to fill the vehicle rapidly as it went 
nose down, but also permitting the crewmembers to escape once the pressure 
 16
from the inflowing water had subsided (Accord, 2012). So, is it more important to 
keep the hatches shut or leave them open? These are just a few questions 
regarding AAV SOPs. In order for the Marine Corps to reclaim the ability to 
“storm the beaches,” it must ensure that AAV SOPs produce a safe and efficient 
environment in which to train.  
3. Statement of Work and Test Plan 
In response to inquiries made at the SE-OPT and from Program Manager 
Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), a SOW was drafted to answer specific 
questions regarding emergency egress and evacuation. The SOW differentiated 
between evacuation (i.e., a slow sinking or disabled vehicle) and egress (i.e., a 
fast sinking or submerged vehicle) scenarios. Factors for the experiment 
proposed in the SOW included 17 or 21 embarked infantry plus three crewman, 
two different personal flotation devices and multiple escape routes. Weapons and 
body armor would remain on the subject during evacuation but be removed 
during egress. The SOW included a requirement to secure a three-day supply of 
food and water plus the approach load for all embarked infantry in accordance 
with the stowage plan. The SOW directed subjects to transfer to a simulated 
recovery vehicle regardless of sink scenario. Several other stipulations regarding 
deliverables, including the test subjects’ anthropometric measurements, were 
requested. The SOW required Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB) to submit 
a feasibility of support (FOS) request for infantry with a normal distribution 
between the 5th and 95th percentile of male Marines. References made to 
learning effects suggested randomization but were contradicted by the 
requirement to perform practice trials before every specified treatment. Although 
not specified, the SOW inferred the response variable would be the time it took 
for subjects to escape under various conditions. The next section will review 
several studies that investigated emergency evacuation from several different 
platforms. The studies were used to inform the design of the present research 
effort. 
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D. REVIEW OF RECENT EGRESS GUIDELINES PRACTICES AND 
RESEARCH 
Research involving human egress from transportation systems is not 
extensive. The studies vary in the type of platform investigated and type of threat 
(e.g., fire, sinking). Further, the various studies proposed used methods ranging 
from computer-aided design simulation to full factorial human subject testing.  
Manpower and Personal Integration (MANPRINT) is the U.S. Army’s 
program for implementing Human Systems Integration (HSI). MANPRINT utilizes 
the Test Operations Procedure (TOP) 1-2-610 parts I and II: Human Factors 
Engineering Procedures and Human Factors Engineering Data Guide for 
Evaluation (HEDGE). The TOP includes various human factors design checklists. 
Many test plans and questionnaires that examine ingress, egress and emergency 
egress, describe emergency egress testing procedures as a familiarization run 
followed by three trials of a specific treatment (trial) recorded for time. Several 
test plans consider the response variable of egress time to be the time it takes a 
subject from the seated position to exit the vehicle by the specified route to a 
distance of three meters from the vehicle. This serves not only to ensure the 
design of the vehicle does not impede egress, but that the subjects are able to 
get a suitable distance away from a vehicle. Test subjects wear mission essential 
equipment, as required by their military occupational specialty (MOS). This 
approach helps determine if the personal equipment makes a subject too bulky to 
egress through a particular hatch or if snags occur. All hatch or route 
combinations are tested. Anthropometric measurements of each test subject are 
recorded and used to determine whether the subjects represent the 5th to the 
95th percentile of the target population for that vehicle. Surveys or questionnaires 
administered after the test, or after each treatment of trials round out the 
emergency egress experimentation procedure for Army vehicles.  
Aviation ingress, egress and emergency egress testing follows the 
guidelines set forth in the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Test 
Operations Procedure (TOP) 7-3-529. The TOP stipulates many of the same 
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guidelines used for ground vehicles. The TOP makes a distinction between 
emergency egress and emergency evacuation as the difference between testing 
individual egress times from all seat locations and a full complement of crew and 
subjects egressing simultaneously. Altering visibility between daylight and 
restricted light serves as an additional option. Unlike the vehicle testing, the TOP 
cites research suggesting that post-crash fires allow the crew and subjects 7 to 
16 seconds to escape. The TOP states, “For a crew to survive under these 
conditions, they must be able to safely egress the aircraft within 10 seconds and 
30 seconds for aircraft fitted with crash-resistant fuel tanks” (ATEC, TOP 7-3-
529, 1991, p. A-1).  
Kennedy, Durbin, Faughn, Kozycki, and Nebel (2004) conducted an 
evaluation of the U.S. Army’s Comanche (RAH-66). They defined emergency 
egress as “actions performed by a crew member to quickly and safely leave the 
aircraft during emergency conditions” (Kennedy et al., 2004, p. 3). The study 
focused on the potential interaction between the crew station and the Air Warrior 
Ensemble. The mockup of the Comanche fuselage they used lacked rotor blades 
and employed crash pads to prevent injuries. These, along with other safety 
constraints, proved a necessary tradeoff to ecological validity. Anthropometry, 
route of ingress or egress and aircrew clothing ensemble served as the input 
variables, while mean emergency egress time served as the response variable. 
Ingress and egress times served only to provide an assessment of “movement 
difficulties, potential safety problems, volume-of-space issues,” etc. Therefore, no 
descriptive statistics were calculated (Kennedy et al., 2004).  
Strict adherence to the Army’s regulations guiding ingress-egress testing 
made the findings suitable for comparison to new or modified aviation systems. 
Four subjects representing the 5th percentile for female, 50th percentile female, 
50th percentile male and the 95th percentile male of the Army pilot population 
served as the test subjects. Extensive anthropometric measurements and 
multiple recordings from motion capture video equipment fed a human figure 
modeling system called Jack (Unigraphics Incorporated). Nonparametric analysis 
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of the emergency egress trials and questionnaires formed the basis of the study’s 
results. In 48 trials, the study yielded an average emergency egress time of 16.6 
seconds, with only two trials taking longer than the 30-second threshold. The 
95th percentile male was the test subject involved in both instances. Jack 
software enabled the researchers to pinpoint the location of the test subject’s 
body and equipment that created difficulty during ingress or egress. 
Questionnaire results supported the objective data. Analysis indicated that 
repeated trials created a training effect, in which times from the second half of 
trials were faster than the first half. 
Havir and Kozycki (2006) assessed emergency egress for the U.S. Army 
Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S). The A2C2S is a specific work 
suite installed in a (UH)-60L Blackhawk helicopter. Similar to Kennedy et al. 
(2004), anthropometry and aircrew clothing ensemble served as the input 
variables, while emergency egress times served as the response variable. 
Blockage of egress routes was another multi-level input variable introduced by 
the researchers. Anthropometric measurements and motion capture video were 
collected and fed into the Jack software. The A2C2S study focused on individual 
crewmember’s emergency egress procedures rather than the entire five-member 
crew as a whole. Analysis included descriptive statistics of the egress trials and 
questionnaire responses.  
The first emergency egress trials had no blocked exits and averaged 
8.5 seconds. The second set of trials involved blocking exits on one side to 
simulate the aircraft on its side and averaged 19.3 seconds. Survey analysis on a 
5-point Likert rating scale rated the egress moderately easy in both scenarios. 
The final phase of testing varied the exits blocked and had the test subjects 
egress through different routes. The results ranged from 13.5 to 29 seconds. In 
one instance, the large male subject became stuck and the trial had to be 
repeated. The researchers created a model using Jack software to make work 
station design changes that would lower egress time. 
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Ryack, Smith, Chamlin and Noddin (1976) designed an experiment to test 
egress from a submerged helicopter. The researchers used an H-3 helicopter 
fuselage attached to a crane. The crane lowered the fuselage into the water at 
which time the fuselage would invert. Trained Navy divers served as test 
subjects. The experiment examined egress route, illumination (daylight or 
restricted) and emergency hatch lighting (light or no light). The response 
variables were time to release of seat belt, time to activation of the hatch, and 
time of arrival to the surface. Test subject seat assignments were randomized. 
Illumination and route trials were blocked and repeated. An emergency breathing 
apparatus was made available to each subject.  
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed statistically significant effects 
and interactions. The factors of window (route) and illumination were found to be 
statistically significant, while the factor of daylight versus restricted was not. 
Egress times ranged from 5.22 to 11.45 seconds. The study concluded that 
window illumination affected egress times and would have had a greater effect 
on untrained (non-divers) subjects. 
Griffin and Mullis (2007) authored an interim test report for the system 
development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the EFV. The report 
encompassed engineering tests directed at multiple performance parameters of 
the EFV prototypes. A section of the report involved a comparative analysis of 
ingress and egress from several different armored vehicles (including the AAV) 
with the EFV prototypes. U.S. Marines and U.S. Navy Corpsman served as test 
subjects. Prior to testing, recording of anthropometric measurements ensured a 
representative sample between the 5th and 95th percentile of male Marines. Part 
of the experiment focused on the waterborne emergency egress of subjects from 
the seated position to the top of the vehicles. Vehicles sat atop dry, flat land and 
the response variable of Egress Time began at notification and ended once the 
final subject reached the top of the vehicle. Input variables consisted of visibility 
(daylight or restricted), load plan variation (four locations of stowing packs), 
squad mission equipment variation (six different troop configurations varying 
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weapons and amount of subjects between 14 and 20), Mission Oriented 
Protective Posture (MOPP) level (MOPP levels describe layers of gear military 
members use to protect themselves during a chemical or biological attack. In this 
experiment, only MOPP-0 and MOPP-IV were used) and route (forward and all 
top hatches). A practice run preceded each version of the timed trial to familiarize 
the subjects. As the test progressed, Subjects opted out of repeating the practice 
run prior to each trial. Each timed trial consisted of three repetitions conducted 
sequentially without randomization. Although the AAV served as a control for the 
EFV egress experiment, no data involving Egress Times from the AAV did not 
occur was kept for record.  
McLean, George, Chittum and Funkhouser (1995) completed a series of 
experiments designed to simulate emergency egress from Type III over-wing 
exits on transport airplanes. The Type-III exit is a small (20″ x 30″) opening much 
like the egress port in an AAV. The purpose of these experiments was to 
determine the most effective passageway from the center aisle to the exit. Seat 
placement and seat encroachment distance into the exit opening were the input 
variables. Egress time for the group, as well as each individual, served as the 
response variables.  
McLean et al. (1995) employed several methods to achieve the most 
realistic egress times possible. First, two groups with similar weight and height 
but different ages (20–40, 40–60) were chosen as test subjects. Age differences 
were used to evaluate agility effects. Second, the groups were familiarized with 
emergency egress procedures, including the opportunity to egress through the 
Type-III exit in the absence of a seat assembly. Third, passageway configuration 
was counterbalanced to reduce carryover effects of prior experience. Common 
carryover effects include learning, fatigue, catching on, assimilation and contrast 
(Price, 2005).  
McLean et al. (1995) also randomized between the groups based on 
passageway and seat factors. This meant that the order of passageway widths 
and seat encroachments Group 1 conducted differed from Group 2 in an attempt 
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to see if test subject naiveté and learning effects confounded the response 
variable. Additionally, they randomized individual seating assignments within the 
groups to give each subject a new starting position for each trial. Further, a 
monetary incentive to encourage highly motivated egress was awarded to the 
three fastest subjects in each group across all egress trials. However, the rules 
stated subjects could not jump in front of others, so the incentive drove a 
“competitive cooperation” in which it was in the best interest of the subjects to 
help those in front of them. A three-way ANOVA was used to analyze the main 
effects and possible interactions of the experiment. The results showed 
significant effects of age, passageway width and seat encroachment distance 
with no significant interactions. Age-related differences in agility were indeed a 
major factor in using the Type-III exit evacuation system. Passageway 
configuration also affected egress times. 
The findings of the McLean et al. (1995) study received criticism from 
airlines and airplane manufacturers because the experimental design lacked 
“absolute fidelity when experimentally simulating an emergency evacuation, in all 
its potential manifestations” (McLean, 2001, p. 1). Specifically, the experiment 
was simple in nature and subjects were allowed to “practice” egress beforehand.  
In response, McLean authored Access-to-Egress: A Meta-Analysis of the 
Factors That Control Emergency Evacuation Through the Transport Airplane 
Type-III Overwing Exit (2001). McLean referenced Perrow’s Normal Accidents 
(1999) extensively.  
Citing Perrow’s assertions, McLean concluded that the criticisms of the 
1995 Type-III study were misguided by stating, “The problem with such an 
ideological approach is that it is built on belief and assumption, not data, 
confounding science and technology with undefined contingencies and 
constraints” (McLean, 2001, p. 5). McLean went on to analyze the results and 
observations for all Type-III exits and concluded that:  
Interactions among these subsystems and elements, where found, 
have been shown to be generally linear, once again being more 
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related to the degree to which human factors effects are 
evidenced…Thus, if physical subsystem elements provide 
inappropriate egress workspace, modify them; if information 
subsystem elements are not informative and useful, perfect them; 
and if the operator/user subsystem elements are not effective or 
efficient, instruct them. Only through this type of balanced approach 
will the success of the [system] be better guaranteed. (McLean, 
2001, p. 31) 
Mclean et al. (2002) organized another experiment to readdress the 
effects of passageway configuration and human factors on egress through the 
Type-III exit and replicate the 1995 experiment. The additional factors added to 
the design allowed for more potential interactions and therefore more analysis. 
The researchers conducted egress trials with 48 groups whose members varied 
in size and age. The larger number of groups permitted counterbalancing. The 
study employed a between-subjects design to ensure naiveté for each individual 
and condition and then used three extra trials for each subject test for 
interactions. In all, 2500 subjects participated in four trials each for a total of 
10,000 individual egress events through the Type-III exit.  
McLean and Corbett (2004) issued a final report based on the 2002 study 
in which they concluded: 
The findings replicate prior research showing that the physical 
attributes of subjects produce large differences in emergency 
evacuation performance, whereas airplane configuration has 
minimal effects on emergency egress, as long as ergonomic 
minimums are respected. Where such problems do exist, 
evacuation experience acts to mitigate such negative effects, as 
does proper subject management by flight attendants. (McLean et 
al., 2004, p. i)  
To conduct an emergency egress experiment on a given system, a clear 
definition of the objective is needed. If the system is a prototype, a design test 
will expose flaws where humans interact with the system, although it may not 
clarify the type of design changes needed. If the system is already well 
established (i.e., a 42-year-old AAV), then how humans perform in that system is 
likely to be the primary focus. Although the military is interested in the technical 
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aspects of a system and the manner in which humans interact with the system, 
the acquisition process is composed mostly of engineers, who understand the 
former better than the latter. Fortunately, the AAV Egress study described in the 
AVTB Test Plan established the requirement to understand the HSI aspects of 
egress from a sinking AAV.  
The egress research described above provides some scenarios, methods 
and objectives that are similar to the present AAV study but others that are 
different. The AAV, like aircraft that possess Type-III overwing exits, is a well-
established system beyond the developmental or operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E) phases of system acquisition. The existence of crew to assist subjects  
is another similarity. Other similarities are that subject space is a single 
compartment and the imminent danger to the subjects requires emergency to 
egress from that space.  
The AAV Egress Study examines at the scenario of a sinking AAV. In 
contrast, the Access-to-Egress research studied a burning plane fuselage. The 
AAV has multiple hatches with different dimensions from which subjects can 
egress, while the fuselage has one exit with multiple possible passageway 
dimensions and seat encroachments. The AAV Egress Study was undertaken to 
test a specific population, while the Access-to-Egress studies used a limited 
cross-section of the general population. (People of all ages can fly on commercial 
airlines, but the experiment did not include the very young or old for safety 
reasons.) The present study leveraged the strengths of previous egress studies 
while attempting to avoid their shortcomings. The AAV Egress Study utilized a 
full-factorial, within-subject design, with counterbalancing to reduce carryover 
effects. Similar to previous studies, egress time is used as the response variable 
and an ANOVA was used to determine main effects, and any interactions. 
1. Hypotheses 
The research questions posed in the introduction guided the methods and 
analysis used in the AAV Egress Study. The factors chosen for the experiment 
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were illumination, number of subjects, body armor, personal flotation device 
(PFD), weapon posture and route. The response variables included Egress Time, 
Transfer Time and Load Time. Explanation of the input variables and the 
response variables appear in Chapter III.  
2. Research Question One 
The first research question asks, “What factors provide Marines in a 
sinking AAV the best chance for survival?” Dividing the question into parts 
allowed for a more thorough investigation. The following paragraphs provide 
hypotheses for each factor.  
The null hypothesis for the Illumination factor states that there is no 
significant difference in the time it takes for subjects to egress from an AAV 
during daylight or restricted conditions. The alternative hypothesis states there is 
a significant difference; daylight will result in lower times.  
The null hypothesis for the Subject factor states that there is no significant 
difference in time it takes for 17 or 21 embarked infantry to egress from the AAV. 
The alternative hypothesis states there is a difference; 17 subjects will egress 
faster than 21 subjects. 
The body armor factor was combined with the personal flotation device 
(PDF) factor to create three levels. See Chapter III for a more detailed 
explanation. The null hypothesis for the combined Armor||PFD factor that there is 
no significant difference in time for subjects required if they (1) drop their body 
armor while wearing the LPU-32; (2) keep their body armor while wearing the 
LPU-32; or (3) keep their body armor while wearing the HESP. The alternative 
hypothesis states at least one combined factor is different from the others.  
The weapons posture factor was combined with the route factor to create 
six levels. See Chapter III for a more detailed explanation. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no significant difference in egress times for subjects who leave their 
weapon while exiting through Routes 1, 3 or 4 and those who take their weapon 
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while exiting through Routes 2, 3, or 5. The alternative hypothesis states at least 
one combined factor is different from the others.  
3. Research Question Two 
The second research question asks, “Is the design of experiment 
appropriate given the safety constraints?” The answer requires subjective 
interpretation of the SOW, SOP and all data collected.  
The Assault Amphibian School Battalion Order P3000.1H is the most 
recent version of the common SOP and describes evacuation and egress 
procedures (BNO P3000.1H, 2012, Appendix J). The SOP states a sinking AAV 
has had its “watertight integrity compromised to the extent that water entering the 
vehicle exceeds the amount of water being pumped out” (BNO P3000.1H, 2012, 
p. 3–6). At the point in which the crew chief realizes the AAV is taking on water 
and the vehicle’s bilge pumps are not matching the water entering the vehicle, he 
must make determination decision to evacuate the vehicle. The SOP describes 
procedures for both slowly and rapidly sinking scenarios. This study examines 
sinking with the combination of the route and weapons posture factors. Some 
combinations of factors are associated with the SOP for slowly sinking scenarios 
whereas the others are aligned with rapidly sinking scenarios.  
4. Research Question Three 
The third research question asks, “Does the current SOP establish the 
conditions that will optimize survivability of the subjects and their equipment 
during waterborne operations?” The data, observations and survey responses 




PM AAA tasked AVTB to perform testing in accordance with the SOW. 
AVTB generated a test plan and submitted it to PM AAA. The test plan mirrored 
the SOW with minor exceptions concerning factors and response variables. The 
test plan specified escape routes for each sink scenario excluding the turret 
hatch. Additionally, the test plan provided a run matrix and questionnaire.  
The overall objective of the experiment was to determine the time a 
reinforced rifle squad requires to egress from an AAV under optimal conditions. 
The assumption is that if the egress time is less than the simulated time for an 
AAV to sink in the water, a favorable survivability situation exists. Altering the 
characteristics of the AAV could alter the simulated time for the AAV to sink. If 
the egress time remains less than the simulated time, then the survivability is still 
favorable. Decisions were made by the PM to sacrifice realism for the sake of 
safety. For example, rather than conducting the experiment in water with a 
sinking AAV, the vehicle was located on dry land.  
The data are analyzed with a linear model, consisting of four independent 
variables and one primary response variables. These independent variables 
were designated by the sponsors and experimenters. The final design was a  
2 x 2 x 3 x 6 full factorial design. The primary response variable is Egress Time: 
time to egress to the top of the AAV. Variables related to Egress Time that also 
were recorded are: Transfer Time: time to transfer from the top of the disabled 
AAV to the recovery AAV and Load Time: time to load subjects. 
The Design of Experiments (DOE) methodology provided an organized 
approach to data collection intended to maximize the range of possible Egress 
Times with a set number of trials. Several SOP considerations eliminated 
unnecessary treatments, creating a full factorial (2 x 2 x 3 x 6) design with  
72 trials. Each treatment was replicated three times giving a total of 216 trials. 
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The experiment used a group of Marines from AVTB and Company B, 1st 
Battalion 4th Marine Regiment (B/1/4). Each member in the group provided 
demographic and anthropometric data that might be relevant to Egress Times 
(see Chapter IV).  
B. RESEARCH TEAM 
The experiment took place at Camp Pendleton’s Del Mar boat basin from 
6 to17 August 2012. AVTB team consisted of one civilian test engineer, one 
Marine Gunnery Sergeant (AAV MOS), four civilian laboratory technicians and 
five Marine AAV crewmen. The Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) team 
included two HSI professors, one postdoctoral research associate, one Marine 
officer graduate student and two undergraduate students. Company B, 1st 
Battalion 4th Marine Regiment (B/1/4), provided the 25 infantry, who served as 
test subjects. 
C. RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
The AAV is the Marine Corps’ primary ship-to-shore connector for 
opposed landings in amphibious assaults. Amphibious assaults are one of the 
primary missions of the infantry. The Marine Corps’ infantry and AAV crewmen 
military occupational specialties (MOS) are open only to males. Rigorous 
physical tests ensure males with these MOSs can perform the mission essential 
tasks required by the AAV Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual. Further, all 
Marines involved in waterborne operations must meet additional water survival 
requirements. These physical requirements narrowed the target population down 
to subjects serving in infantry battalions.  
D. EQUIPMENT 
The AVTB staff and laboratory technicians set up a large test bay to 
perform the experiment. Tape and cardboard on the test bay windows prevented 
light from entering during simulated restricted trials, allowing for experimentation 
during the day with no illumination. AVTB provided one AAV with current 
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specifications to serve as the notional sinking AAV. Another AAV, parked 
alongside, was used as the recovery vehicle for the subjects to transfer to after 
they egressed from the notional AAV. A staircase allowed the subjects to climb 
down from the recovery AAV after the transfer. Closed circuit digital cameras 
captured video and audio data of each run from inside the troop compartment 
and outside the AAV. All video and audio data files were time stamped.  
The NPS team brought items from the HSI Laboratory to augment the 
experiment at AVTB (see Appendix E for list). Among these items were the 
anthropometry equipment used to measure each Marine participating in the 
experiment.  
E. VARIABLES 
The Variables Section describes in detail, the dependent and independent 
variables used throughout the experiment and analysis. 
1. Response Variable 
The main response variable (Egress Time) was time elapsed from 
notification to egress of the last subject reaching the top of the AAV. 
2. Snag Variable 
At the end of each trial each subject was asked if he had become snagged 
or stuck during the egress or evacuation. The subject number and the manner in 
which he was snagged were recorded. 
3. Independent Variables 
The SOW generated at the SE-OPT specified multiple factors and levels 
based on SOP, safety considerations and desired treatments for the two egress 
scenarios. The following are the factors and levels used in the study. 
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a. Illumination (Daylight or Restricted) 
During daylight trials, the cargo bay doors were open allowing for ample 
illumination. During restricted trials, the cargo bay doors remained closed and the 
windows were blacked-out. The recovery vehicle used its floodlight and chem 
lights were placed in positions that facilitated safe movement.  
b. Subject Load (17 infantry + 3 crewman or 21 infantry + 3 
crewman) 
A doctrinal Marine infantry rifle squad has 13 members. It is often the 
practice to attach or reinforce a standard rifle squad with a section from one of 
the squads in the weapons platoon. The resulting number of Marines in the 
squad is usually 17 or 21. All subjects in the trials with 17 Marines participated in 
the trials with 21. Additionally, the same three crewmen participated in every trial 
of the experiment. With minor exceptions, the subjects remained the same for all 
trials. 
c. Body Armor and Personal Flotation Device (Keep LPU-32; 
Drop LPU-32; Keep HESP) 
The independent variable, Armor/PDF, has three levels that capture the 
combination of Armor and PDF worn by subjects. The LPU-32 is the current PFD 
used by the AAV community. It is worn under the body armor. The LPU-41 
Helicopter Egress System for Passengers (HESP) is a newer PFD and is worn 
over the body armor. Removing the body armor allows subjects to reduce weight 
and bulk. Keeping the body armor on allows subjects to begin egress procedures 
more quickly. Since the HESP is worn over the body armor, a condition in which 
subjects wore the HESP and removed their body armor was not tested.  
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d. Weapon and Route (Take1; Take3; Take4; Leave2; Leave3; 
Leave5) 
The six levels in this independent variable were driven by current AAV 
standard operating procedure. The levels are a combination of take or leave 
weapon and the number of hatches used for egress: 1, 3, or 4 when weapons 
are taken; 2, 3, or 5 when weapons are left. In a disabled or slow sink scenario, 
Marines take their weapons with them when they transfer to the recovery vehicle. 
In a rapid sink scenario, subjects exit the AAV as quickly as possible and leave 
all equipment behind, including their weapons. The routes (or number of hatches) 
used in this study also were based on the AAV SOP. There are five hatches on 
an AAV: two cargo hatches; the troop commander’s hatch; the driver’s hatch; and 
the crew chief’s hatch (see Figure 2). When a vehicle is rapidly sinking all 
available hatches are used. Sometimes, due to the condition of the sinking 
vehicle, certain hatches may become too hard to access or open. Therefore, 
rapid sink scenarios used all five hatches, only the front three hatches (troop 
commander’s, driver’s and crew chief’s), or only the two cargo hatches. For a 
slow sink scenario, the SOP instructs subjects to leave the portside cargo hatch 
shut in order to stage equipment and personnel for transfer to the recovery 
vehicle. As a result, the slow sink scenarios used the front three hatches and the 



























Figure 2. Top down view of AAV with hatch descriptions 
F. DATA COLLECTION/PROCEDURES 
The SE-OPT designated two weeks to conduct the study at Camp 
Pendleton, Ca. A feasibility of support (FOS) was sent to 1st Marine Division to 
request 22 infantry to serve as subjects (21 subjects and one alternate). Three 
crew members (driver, crewman, crew chief) would participate throughout the 
experiment as well. Subjects were told participation was completely voluntary. 
They were briefed on the study and then they all read and signed informed 
consent statements. Next, the research team measured the body dimensions of 
all subjects. There were eight anthropometric measurements of interest. They 
were stature, weight, chest depth, shoulder circumference, chest circumference, 
waist circumference, buttock circumference and shoulder breadth. Since subjects 
traveling in an AAV will always be wearing a uniform and equipment, 
measurements were taken in their shorts and t-shirt (PT gear), in their uniform 
(Slick) and finally with their combat load (see Appendix D for measurements). 
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Next, the subjects performed three familiarization trials in which they loaded into 
the AAV, were told which hatches to use, and whether to take their weapons and 
wear their body armor. Load times and egress times were recorded so the 
research team could validate the data collection plan for the remainder of the 
study. Each evening, data from that day’s trials were entered into Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets. Each Marine was assigned a subject number, a specific weapon, 
and a seat assignment and these remained constant throughout the study. 
During all trials the researchers positioned themselves around the AAVs 
according to their designated task. One researcher sat on top of the “sinking” 
AAV with a stopwatch to record the time when the last Marine was standing on 
top of the vehicle. The researcher also noted when subjects became snagged. 
Prior to each trial a Marine GySgt gave final instructions to the subjects and the 
crew chief. On the recovery AAV two other researchers recorded the order in 
which the subjects exited the “sinking” AAV. A crewman from the recovery AAV 
assisted the subjects in moving from the “sinking” AAV to the recovery AAV. 
Another researcher stood at the bottom of the staircase to ask whether they 
became snagged and if so, how it happened. Test engineers monitored the 
closed-circuit video feeds in a separate room and recorded times based on clock 
time. The third HSI professor sat in an elevated position observing the overall 
event unfold (see Appendix F for the list of the 216 trials conducted during days 
Two through Nine). 
On the final day, the researchers administered a survey and conducted 
after action review with all subjects. Throughout the two weeks, members of 
AVTB, PM AAA and the AAV School at Del Mar provided additional assistance. 
Chapter IV provides the results of the data analysis. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we present the analysis of the results from the experiment 
conducted during the AAV Egress Study. The chapter has six sections. A 
demographics and anthropometrics section further describes the sample of 
subjects used in this study. The next section discusses the response variables 
and factors chosen for the experiment followed by the analysis of these 
variables. Analysis of the number of snags gives brief insight into the occurrence 
of snags as the experiment unfolded. Finally, we use survey analysis to describe 
post-experiment surveys gathered from each subject.  
B. DEMOGRAPHICS 
In this section, we explore the demographics of the test subjects. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of age for the sample. The median age is 20, the mean is 
20.65 and the standard deviation is 2.48. The range of ages is from 18 to 27.  
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Subject Age in years 
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The majority of the subjects were new to the Marine Corps. Time in 
service (TIS) is each subject’s service time measured in months. Figure 4 shows 
the distribution of TIS. The median service time is 7.5 months the mean is  
17.9 months and the standard deviation is 21.75 months. The crewman had the 
longest service time followed by the Marine who acted as the troop commander 
and sat in the designated troop commander seat. The range of TIS is from  
5 months to 79 months. 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Subject TIS in months 
To illustrate the level of experience beyond TIS Table 1 shows the number 
of subjects with zero, one or two deployments. 
Table 1. Deployment Distribution  
Deployments Summary
Deployments None One Two




Another indication of experience is individual rank. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of rank for the sample. The crewmen were the only noncommissioned 
officers (E4 and E5) in the sample. The other 23 subjects were Lance Corporal 
and below (E3 and below).  
Table 2. Distribution of Rank: Private (PVT);Private First Class (PFC);  
Lance Corporal (LCPL); Corporal (CPL); Sergeant (SGT) 
Rank Summary
Rank PVT (E1) PFC (E2) LCPL (E3) CPL (E4) SGT (E5)
Subjects (26) 1 19 3 1 2
 
 
To assess the subjects’ conditioning level, physical fitness test (PFT) and 
combat fitness test (CFT) scores provided insight. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show 
the distributions of subject’s most recent PFT and CFT scores, respectively. 
Table 3 shows the range of each score (it is important to note that a perfect score 
is 300 for either test). 
 
 




Figure 6. Distribution of CFT Scores 











The demographic data revealed no relationships between physical 
conditioning and age or experience. Attempts to do regression analysis between 
the dependent variables of PFT or CFT scores and the independent variables of 
Age, TIS, and Deployments yielded no evidence of a relationship.  
Absence of population data made comparison of the sample to the 
population infeasible. It appears, though, that the subjects had slightly below 
average age, TIS and rank, with slightly above average physical conditioning. 
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With the absence of infantry noncommissioned officers, the group of subjects 
appeared young and inexperienced. Further, they had an average of 267 and 
280 for the PFT and CFT, respectively. The high physical test scores indicate 
above average physical condition. For reference, an average reinforced rifle 
squad contains four to five noncommissioned officers with one or two staff 
noncommissioned officers (E6 and above) and, quite often, a company grade 
officer (O1 to O3). Despite the discrepancies of the demographics, the group 
developed a cohesive behavior as the experiment progressed. Subjects 
understood individual roles regarding billet and acted upon those distinctions as if 
they were higher ranks. Thus, although the sample did not match the population 
demographically, it generally resembled the population.  
C. ANTHROPOMETRICS 
The population for this experiment consists of infantry that are members of 
companies designated to operate with AAV platoons during Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU) deployments. Unfortunately, anthropometric measurements for 
infantry are incomplete. Instead, for comparison, we used 138 anthropometric 
measurements based on a sample of 1356 males taken from the general Marine 
Corps population in 2011. 
1. Unequipped Measurements 
We first compare eight anthropometric measurements taken while 
subjects were in their PT gear with comparable measurements taken from the 
2011 Marine Corps sample. The eight measurements are: stature (height), 
weight, shoulder circumference, chest circumference, waist circumference, 
buttock circumference, chest depth, and bideltoid breadth. All measurements are 
in centimeters with the exception of weight, measured in kilograms. Figure 7 
through Figure 14 show boxplots comparing the Egress Study subjects to the 
Marine Corps sample for each of the eight measurements, respectively. The 




Figure 7. Boxplots of Stature for each Group 














Figure 8. Boxplots of Weight for each Group 













Figure 9. Boxplots of Shoulder Circumference per group 





Median 118.50 117.70 116.40
Mean 120.00 118.60 116.30
SD 7.48 5.59 5.89
Minimum 107.90 107.90 95.50
Maximum 142.10 126.30 133.80





Figure 10. Boxplots for Chest Circumference per group 













Figure 11. Boxplots of Waist Circumference per group 













Figure 12. Boxplots for Buttock Circumference per group 













Figure 13. Boxplots for Chest Depth per group  













Figure 14. Boxplots for Bideltoid Breadth per group 











A large sample two-sided two-sample test of the null hypothesis that the 
expected anthropometric measurements were the same for the Egress Study 
subjects and for the Marine Corps (based on the two samples of 26 and 1356) 
was conducted for each of the eight anthropometric measurements. Of the eight 
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hypothesis tests, only two were rejected: the test for mean shoulder 
circumference with p-value 0.0201 and the test for the mean waist circumference 
with p-value .0049. Two of the 26 Egress Study subjects, subjects 6 and 20 had 
unusually large shoulders with circumference of 142.05 cm and 131.90 cm, 
respectively. Summary statistics of shoulder circumference for the remaining 24 
subjects are given in Table 6. The distribution of shoulder circumference of the 
24 subjects is comparable to that of the Marine Corps sample. The mean waist 
circumference of the Egress Study subjects is sufficiently smaller than that of the 
Marine Corps sample to reject the null hypothesis that their expected values are 
equal. However, the difference between 88.40 - 83.85 = 4.55 cm with a standard 
error of 1.49 is very small and not of practical significance to this study.  
In general, the anthropometric measurements of the Egress Study 
subjects are comparable to that of the general Marine Corps. 
2. Equipped Measurements 
Broadbent, Cornelius, Talebi and Playter (2009) used three-dimensional 
CAD models of Marines in the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles based on size 
carrying a rifle, rifle with grenade launcher, pistol and a Squad Automatic 
Weapon (SAW) medium machine gun. Figure 15 shows a 50th percentile combat-
loaded Marine rifleman. Figure 16 shows 5th, 50th and 95th percentile Marines 
sitting side-by-side. Broadbent et al. (2009) also included weight tables for 
combat loaded Marines with each weapon for all three percentiles. The AAV 
Egress Study weighed subjects with a slightly different combat load set. 
However, the itemized list of weights found in Broadbent et al. (2009) allowed for 
subtraction of the items not present for the Egress Study. Table 12 shows a 
comparison of weights without weapon from the Egress Study with those 





Figure 15. 50th percentile Rifleman (from Broadbent et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 16. 5th, 50th and 95th percentile Marine rifleman (from Broadbent et al., 
2009) 
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Table 12. Summary Statistics of Weights with Equipment but without Weapon 










Table 12 shows that the Egress Study subjects’ weights were within the 
5th to 95th percentiles of the Marine Corps weights. With only a six-pound 
difference between the median weights of the two groups, the combat loaded 
Egress Study subject weights resemble those of the Marine Corps population. 
D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
After the experiment, data were screened to ensure accuracy. Time 
stamped video served as a check for any disputed data point. Three data sheets 
from three different recorders were compared. Any data point found different 
from the same data point in another data set was reviewed by watching the 
video. The data set recorded by the experimenter sitting on top of the sinking 
AAV was the most accurate, having only to be corrected one time. The following 
statistics serve to describe the results of the response variables and factors used 
in the AAV Egress Study.  
1. Response Variable 
For each trial, three time variables were recorded: Egress Time, Transfer 
Time and Load Time. Of these, Egress Times is the primary response variable. 
Load Times provided data for the Seatbelt factor and served as a response 
variable in a parallel study. Transfer Times are the time to egress plus the time to 
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transfer to a recovery vehicle. An additional response variable of Snags provides 
further insight into the experiment’s results and is discussed later in the chapter. 
Figure 17 shows a histogram of the distribution of Egress Times across all 
216 trials. The overall mean is 98.77 seconds (1:39), compared to the median of 
76.6 seconds (1:17). There were four extreme Egress Times. Excluding them 
reduces the range of Egress Times by over two minutes (370–248.4 = 121.6 
seconds), however does little to change the mean or median. Table 13 gives 
summary statistics for Egress Times with and without extreme values. Each 
extreme Egress Time corresponds to a different treatment with only one level in 
common; all four involved subjects evacuating with their weapon through the 
forward three hatches (Take3).  
 
Figure 17. Distribution of Egress Times in seconds  
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The slow sink scenario requires subjects to transfer to a recovery vehicle. 
The rapid sink scenarios force subjects to jettison themselves from the sinking 
vehicle as quickly as possible. Safety constraints would not allow subjects to 
jump from the 11-foot high vehicle in the test bay; therefore, subjects had to 
transfer during rapid sink scenarios as well. Table 14 shows summary statistics 
for Egress and Transfer Times and for Egress Times subtracted from Transfer 
Times (Transfer–Egress). Figure 18 provides a histogram of the difference 
between Egress Times and Transfer Times across all 216 trials. The average 
time it took subjects to transfer from the top of the sinking vehicle to the recovery 
vehicle was 3.88 seconds with a median of 3.7 seconds. The experiment took 
place on land, so the presence of undulations due to sea state did not exist, 
making the transfer very uneventful. Because Transfer Times-Egress Times are 
small giving a 0.99 correlation between Egress Times and Transfer Times and 
because transfers only pertain to slow sink scenarios, we used Egress Times 
rather than Transfer Times as the response variable. 
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Table 14. Comparison between Egress and Transfer Times 
Egress vs. Transfer Times Summary
Statistic (sec) Egress Times Transfer Times Transfer ‐ Egress
Median 76.60 79.80 3.70
Mean 98.78 102.66 3.88
SD 61.41 61.28 1.22
Minimum 28.70 33.10 1.10
Maximum 370.00 372.80 9.00










The experimental design described in Chapter III contained six factors. In 
order to balance the design, two pairs of factors are combined leaving four 
factors overall. Those factors are Illumination, Passengers, Armor||PFD and 
Weapons/Route. 
a. Illumination 
The Illumination factor has two levels: Daylight and Restricted. There were 
36 treatments associated with each level, totaling 108 trials. Table 15 provides 
the summary statistics of Egress Times by Daylight vs. Restricted. Figure 19 
shows the boxplots of Egress Times for Daylight and Restricted. Figure 19 
suggests that there is not much difference in the Egress Times associated with 
Daylight and Restricted treatments. However, as mentioned in Chapter III, the 
subjects egressed from a dark compartment to a visible topside in both 
Illumination levels due to the presence of a floodlight on the recovery vehicle 
during the Restricted treatments (as per SOP). The presence of the flood light 
gave over 98% illumination according to a light meter, offering an explanation as 
to why the times were so close. 














Figure 19. Boxplots of Daylight and Restricted Egress Times with the grand 
mean Egress Time (98.78 sec) plotted in black 
b. Passengers 
The Passengers factor has two levels of “17” and “21” representing the 
number of embarked infantry the AAV is carrying not including the three 
crewmen. There were 36 treatments associated with each level, totaling 108 
trials. Table 16 gives summary statistics for the Egress Times associated with 17 
and 21 subjects. Figure 20 shows the boxplots of Egress Times for 17 and 21 
subjects.  















Figure 20. Boxplots for 17 and 21 Passengers Egress Times with the grand 
mean Egress Time (98.78 sec) plotted in black 
c. Armor||PFD 
The Armor||PFD factor has three levels: DropLPU-32, KeepLPU-32 and 
KeepHESP. There were 24 treatments associated with each level, yielding 72 
trials per treatment. Table 17 shows summary statistics for Egress Times for 
each level. Figure 21 shows the boxplots of Egress Times for all three levels. The 
Egress Times for DropLPU-32 level tend to be faster than the Egress Times for 
the KeepLPU-32 and KeepHESP levels, while Egress Times for the KeepLPU-32 
and KeepHESP levels seem to be similar.  
Table 17. Armor||PFD Factor Summary Statistics 
Armor||PFD Summary
Statistic/Level Drop LPU‐32 Keep LPU‐32 Keep HESP
Median 68.20 73.30 85.90
Mean 82.49 101.54 112.30
SD 43.02 63.38 71.39
Minimum 30.50 28.70 28.70
Maximum 204.00 271.30 370.00





Figure 21. Boxplots of Armor||PFD Egress Times with the grand mean Egress 
Time (98.78 sec) plotted in black 
d. Weapon||Route 
The Weapon||Route factor contains the levels Take1, Take3, Take4, 
Leave2, Leave3 and Leave5. There were 12 treatments associated with each 
level, giving 36 trials per level. Table 18 shows the summary statistics for Egress 
Times. Figure 22 shows the boxplots of Egress Times for each level. The middle 
50% of Egress Times (represented by the boxes in Figure 22) for the Leave3 
level and all Egress Times for the Take3 level are greater than the grand mean 
Egress Times indicating generally slow Egress Times when subjects are forced 
to egress through the forward three hatches.  
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Table 18. Weapon||Route Factor Summary Statistics 
Weapon||Route Summary
Statistic/Level Leave5 Leave2 Take4 Take1 Leave3 Take3
Median 39.60 46.25 67.40 87.75 138.25 189.20
Mean 42.08 49.66 72.34 91.46 142.90 194.21
SD 10.12 16.67 17.87 22.43 42.62 47.08
Minimum 28.70 34.30 50.90 65.20 76.60 128.40
Maximum 66.00 124.60 125.00 153.50 246.20 370.00




Figure 22. Boxplots for Weapon||Route Egress Times with the grand mean 
Egress Time (98.78 sec) plotted in black 
E. INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
This section examines the data using ANOVA to make inferences about 
emergency egress times from an AAV as a function of the conditions varied in 
the experiment, namely the illumination, the number of subjects, the type of 
Armor and PFD combination, and the type of Weapon and Route combination.  
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1. Model 
The experimental design is a full factorial design. With treatment 
replication, we were able to fit a full factorial ANOVA model with all main effects, 
and all interactions. In the full factorial model, there are four main effects, six two-
way interactions, four three-way interactions and one four-way interaction. The 
response variable Egress Times does not have constant variance. The variability 
of Egress Times is greater for trials with larger mean Egress Times. This can be 
seen in the fan shaped pattern of residuals in Figure 23. It can also be seen more 
directly in Figure 24, which plots the Egress Times for all three replications of the 
72 treatments. The black and blue lines show the overall mean and median 
Egress Time, respectively. It becomes obvious that the treatments involving the 
forward three hatches (Leave3 and Take3) not only have the larger times but the 
difference between those times is greater. 
 
Figure 23. Residuals vs. Predicted Values based on an ANOVA fit with Egress 




Figure 24. Variability of Egress Times by Treatment (Mean: black dotted line, 
Median: blue dotted line) 
To stabilize the variance, we transform the response variable. The log 
transformation of Egress Times provides an adequate variance stabilizing 
transformation as can be seen in Figure 25, which shows the plot of the residuals 
from the full factorial model fit with the log of Egress Times as the response 
variable against the corresponding predicted values. Further confirmation is 
provided by the Box-Cox transformation. The estimated power for the Box-Cox 
transform has a 95% confidence interval of [-0.2, 0.1], which includes zero, the 
power that corresponds to a log transformation.  
 
Figure 25. Log of Egress Times Residual by Predicted Egress Times 
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2. Confounding Factors 
Considering the experiment was not completely randomized, confounding 
factors were introduced as the experiment unfolded. Figure 26 reveals a pattern 
in the residuals showing a negative slope over the course of the experiment 
indicating there is dependence in the observations. In order to account for the 
systematic trend shown in Figure 26, we add the factors Replication Order (which 
records the order of the trial in each treatment), Seatbelts (which indicates if the 
trial was part of a parallel study requiring seatbelts), and Time of Day (TOD).  
 
Figure 26. Log of Egress Times by Run Order 
3. Replication Order 
The decreasing residuals based on Run Order, suggests that the test 
subjects learned as the experiment progressed. Randomization of the treatment 
replications attempted to reduce learning effects. Looking at the means of each 
treatment in Table 19, one can plainly see that learning occurred (Note: A, B and 
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C represent the 1st, 2nd and 3rd replication of a specific treatment). Figure 27 
shows the residuals for each treatment decreasing with each replication. 
Table 19. Replication Order Summary Statistics 
Replication Order Summary
Statistic/Order A B C
Median 95.20 72.80 67.20
Mean 115.10 95.40 85.90
SD 70.10 57.30 52.70
Minimum 36.90 30.70 28.70
Maximum 370.00 248.40 218.60





Figure 27. Boxplots of Residuals by Replication Order 
One possible explanation may lie within the group of test subjects. Upon 
arrival, subjects answered demographic questions including their experience with 
AAVs. With the exception of the crewmen, the subjects had almost no 
experience. All subjects acting as embarked infantry, had less than ten months in 
the service and had never worked together. Adding replication order as a 
 63
confounding factor, with levels A, B and C, accounts for some of the trends seen 
in Figure 27. Figure 28 plots the residuals of the new model for Log Egress Time, 
which included the factor Run Order. Including Run Order as a factor removes 
much of the trend evident in Figure 28 however, the large dip in the middle 
(indicated by the red circle) of the plot in Figure 28 suggests additional 
confounding.  
 
Figure 28. Log Egress Time Residuals (with Replication Order)  
against Run Order 
4. Seatbelts 
We note that out of eight test days, the middle four contained trials for the 
parallel study involving seat belts. On test days 3, 4, 5 and 6 there were three 
seat belt trials in the beginning that served as practice trials for the main 
experiment. Table 20 shows the Egress Times for the Seat Belt Factor. Figure 29 
plots the difference between the residuals for trials with and without the presence 
of seat belt trials. 
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Figure 29. Residuals plotted against Run Order with smoothers fit to residuals 
corresponding to treatments with (red) and without (blue) seatbelts 
5. Time of Day 
Another potential confounding factor is time of day for each trial. 
Experimentation took place between the hours of 0800–1100 and 1300–1600 
(see Appendix F for run matrix). Figure 30 reveals a TOD effect in the later part 
of the experiment. Table 21 shows the Egress Times for TOD Factor. 
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Figure 30. Residuals plotted against Run number with smoothers fit to 
residuals corresponding to Time of Day AM (red) and PM (blue) 










6. Adjusting the Model 
To reduce the effects of seat belts and TOD, as well as possible 
interactions, we fit a model containing the original factors (Illumination, 
Passengers, Armor||PFD, Weapon||Route) and the potential confounding 
variables (Replication Order, Seat Belts, TOD) with interactions. Figure 31 shows 
the residuals for the model fit plotted against Run Order. With the confounding 
variables there no longer appears to be a trend in the residuals with run number. 
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Figure 31. Adjusted model residuals against Run Order 
The outlier in Figure 32, with a residual of 0.344, corresponds to run 22. 
However, this observation is not unduly influential. Its Cook’s Distance is less 
than 0.15 as can be seen by the plot of Cook’s Distance in Figure 32. Figure 32 
also shows that none of the other observations is influential for this model. All 
Cook’s Distances in Figure 32 are well below 1.0. In addition, residual plots for 
the adjusted model with the confounding variables confirm that the ANOVA 
modeling assumptions are met (i.e., errors are well modeled as independent, 




Figure 32. Cook’s Distance against Run Order 
7. Factor Selection 
The next step is to remove unnecessary terms. Table 22 shows the model 
of the main effects and all interactions for both the factors and confounding 
variables. Backwards elimination starting with the full model (including 
confounding factors) yields the model fit given in Table 23.  
 68
Table 22. Model before Factor Elimination (Full Model) 
 
 
Table 23. Model after Factor Elimination 
 
8. Interpretation 
The model in Table 23 has interactions between Illumination and 
Passenger factors as well as the Armor||PFD and Weapon||Route factors. Figure 
33 takes a closer look at the interaction between Illumination and Passengers. 
The difference in mean Log Egress Times for 17 to 21 embarked infantry is only 
slight during daylight conditions shown by the near flat blue line. During restricted 
conditions, the difference is significant as seen by the positively sloped red line. 
 69
The most interesting difference is between Restricted17 and Daylight17, where it 
shows Restricted17 has overall lower mean Log Egress Times than Daylight17.  
 
 
Figure 33. Interaction Plot of Mean Log Egress Time by Illumination  
and Passengers 
Figure 34 gives the interaction plot when Illumination and Passengers are 
concatenated to create one factor with four levels against Replication Order. The 
plot shows a spike in Treatment A for Daylight17, marked by the red circle. A 
Tukey HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) multiple comparison test conducted 
in the presence of other factors found that in fact Restricted17 had lower Egress 
Times than Daylight17 regardless of Replication Order. Further, Daylight17 and 
Daylight21 were not significantly different, while Daylight21 and Restricted21 
were. Thus, when accounting for the results with differences in replication order 


















Figure 34. Interaction Plot of Mean Log Egress Times by 
Illumination||Passengers and Replication Order 
Figure 35 shows little interaction between Armor||PFD and 
Weapon||Route. KeepHESP mean Egress Times are slightly greater than those 
of KeepLPU-32. This makes sense; the HESP device went over top of the body 
armor while the LPU-32 fit underneath causing less bulk and lower susceptibility 
to snags. The DropLPU-32 mean Egress Times are faster than those for the 
other two levels of Armor||PFD and for all Weapon||Route, with one exception: 
the Leave5 level. For the Leave5 level, all subjects left their weapons and 
egressed through the nearest hatch as quickly as possible, presenting almost no 
chance for snags. In the Drop Armor||PFD treatments, subjects had to first drop 
their body armor delaying their egress. Thus, the Keep levels have slightly slower 
Egress Times. For the Leave2 level, the driver and troop commander dropped 
their body armor before crawling back through to the cargo hatches, giving them 
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a slimmer profile and reducing the chance for snags. Take4 trials are similar to 
Leave5, however the subjects are restricted from using the portside cargo hatch 
and they have to take their weapons. The Take1 level is the same as the Take4 
level except the driver and troop commander must make their way to the 
starboard cargo hatch while carrying their weapon. The biggest differences in 
mean Log Egress Times occur in the Leave3 Weapon||Route level. During the 
Leave3 and Take3 treatments, subjects in the back move to the forward three 
hatches based on a simulated inability to open the cargo hatches. Only the driver 
and troop commander’s hatches are available for egress. The driver’s hatch sits 
forward of the troop commander’s hatch, so the subjects (with the exception of 
the driver and crew chief) egress through the troop commander’s hatch. In a 
Leave3, the subjects leave their weapon. The DropLPU-32 level through the 
troop commander’s hatch has an average Egress Time of 98.3 seconds. The 
Keep levels have an average Egress Time of 162.4 seconds for KeepLPU-32 
and 168.1 seconds for KeepHESP. With over a minute difference, it becomes 
apparent that regardless of PFD type, wearing body armor in a situation that 
















Figure 35. Interaction Plot Armor||PFD against Weapon||Route 
A Tukey HSD test performed on Weapon||Route and Armor||PFD in the 
presence of the other factors yielded significant differences in the levels of the 
two combined factors. All six levels of Weapon||Route had significant differences. 
Forward hatch treatments had the highest Egress Times, followed by single 
cargo hatch treatments. Treatments that involved both cargo hatches yielded the 
lowest times. The Tukey HSD test for Armor||PFD yielded DropLPU-32’s Egress 
Times were significantly lower than Keep/LPU-32, which in turn were lower than 
those of KeepHESP. The test infers that dropping body armor decreases Egress 
Time. Thus, dropping body armor decreased Egress Times and wearing the 
LPU-32 PFD tended to yield smaller Egress Times than wearing the LPU-
41/SRU-43 HESP. 
Figure 36 shows Replication Order A has the largest mean Log Egress 
Times followed by Replication Order B then C. The presence of seatbelt trials did 
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not start during Replication Order A until Run number 69. At this point, 50 trials 
from Replication Order A and 18 trials from Replication Order B had been 
completed. The seatbelt trials continued through the rest of Replication Order B 
until 18 trials into Replication Order C. This left 54 remaining trials from 
Replication Order C that were not a part of the seatbelt trials. Figure 36 shows 
the interaction between the confounding variables Replication Order and 
Seatbelts.  
 
Figure 36. Interaction Plot of Mean Log Egress Times by Seatbelts  
and Replication Orders 
F. SNAG DATA 
After the first day of testing, it became apparent that snags occurred often 
and required recording. A protocol, developed to record the nature of each snag, 
started on the second testing day with run 28. Table 24 shows the summary 
statistics for snags counts by subject and by run. Table 25 gives the summary 
statistics of snags based on Armor||PFD treatment. Although KeepLPU-32 had a 
significantly larger average number of snags than KeepHESP, subjects reported 
having more trouble with the KeepHESP configuration. As mentioned in Chapter 
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III, subjects only knew if they were dropping or keeping their armor just before 
they were given the order to exit the AAV during the LPU-32 treatments; 
however, they had advance warning and practice when conducting the 
KeepHESP treatments. DropLPU-32 had as many subjects getting stuck in the 
flotsam that developed when they dropped their armor as they did snags from the 
KeepLPU-32.  
Table 24. Summary Statistics for Total Number of Snags by Subjects  













Table 25. Summary Statistics for Number of Snags by Armor||PFD 
Armor||PFD Snag Summary
Statistic/Level Drop LPU‐32 Keep LPU‐32 Keep HESP
Median 2 3 2.5
Mean 1.78 3.57 3.43
SD 0.98 2.59 2.48
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 5 11 10
Snag Total 37 53 56
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Table 26 shows the top five snag counts by subjects with several 
revealing measurements. The two highest snag counts belonged to subjects  
6 and 20. These individuals ranked either first or second in every anthropometric 
category. Subject 6 also carried the only M240G, a medium machine gun 
weighing 11 Kg (24.2 lbs.) and 120.65 cm (47.5 inches) long. The next largest 
weapon carried was the M249 SAW weighing 6.88 Kg (15.2 lbs.) and 103.8 cm 
(40.9 inches) long. The subjects with SAWs did not seem to have an unusual 
number of snags. Subjects 4, 11, and 18 had the next highest number of snags. 
All three subjects’ anthropometric measurements fell near the middle of the 
sample with the exception of the bideltoid breadth of subjects 4 and 11. To view 
all anthropometric measurements for the sample see Appendix D.  
Table 26. Top Five Sang Counts based on Subject Anthropometric 
Measurements 
Top Five Snag Count
Subject ID Snags PT vs. CL Weight Weapon Total Weight PT Chest Depth PT Bideltoid Breadth
6 58 239(1st)/292(1st) M240G 316.2 27.6(2nd) 59.25(1st)
20 51 228(2nd)/278(2nd) M4/203 289 28.35(1st) 55.75(2nd)
4 41 169(15th)/224(10th) M4 231.5 24.7(6th) 55.6(3rd)
11 40 171(14th)/220(14th) M4 227.5 23.45(14th) 53.65(4th)
18 39 172(13th)/214(16th) M4 221.5 23(17th) 48.25(16th)  
 
Table 27 shows the distribution of the number of snags based on 
Weapon||Route. The mean number of snags does not correspond to mean 
Egress Times as seen in Table 18. However, the total number of snags 
increases with mean Egress times in Table 18. This suggests that while snags 
may contribute to an increase in Egress Times based on Weapon||Route it is not 
the sole factor.  
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Table 27. Weapon||Route Snag Summary Statistics 
Weapon||Route Snag Summary
Statistic/Level Leave 5 Leave 2 Take 4 Take 1 Leave 3 Take 3
Median 1 2 2 1.5 4.5 4
Mean 1.38 2.15 2.21 1.75 4.38 4.58
SD 0.65 0.93 1.53 0.94 2.81 2.61
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 3 4 6 4 10 11
N 13 20 24 24 32 33
 
 
Figure 37 plots the number snags by the factors of Weapon||Route and 
Armor||PFD. In both cases where the subjects kept their armor on, snags 
occurred at a greater frequency than dropping armor. KeepLPU-32 had a slightly 
higher mean number of snags, while KeepHESP had a greater total number of 
snags and more complaints from the subjects. There is no clear difference in the 
number of snags when taking or leaving a weapon. It is possible that although 
subjects had a greater weight burden during Take treatments, other subjects 
staging on top of the vehicle assisted fellow subjects with their weapons, causing 
fewer snags to occur. Leave treatments, although less cumbersome for subjects, 
resulted in additional flotsam, increasing the possibility of snags (this is partially 
substantiated by subject comments). Additionally, Route had an effect, as seen 




Figure 37. Interaction Plot of Mean Number of Snags for Weapon||Route  
and Armor||PFD 
G. SURVEY ANALYSIS 
On the final day of the AAV Egress Study, experimenters walked through 
the AAV with the subjects and conducted live surveys. Subjects were asked 
forms of questions. The first asked about the difficulty of egress from the AAV 
under different conditions on a seven-point Likert Scale. The second asked about 
individual factor levels. For instance, “Which condition made it more difficult to 
exit the AAV?” Answers provided included Daylight, Restricted or Same. The 
only exception was the Route question, which had answers for all five routes. 
The third provided space for the subject to write a response. A copy of the survey 
is in Appendix G.  
Table 28 gives summary statistics for the first set of questions. The mean 
responses indicate the severity of a factor level against all other factor levels. In 
this case, subjects felt leaving their weapon behind allowed for the easiest 
egress, while using the LPU-41/SRU-43 HESP made egress the most difficult.  
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Table 28. Summary Statistics for Questions Concerning Difficulty of  
Egress (Measured on a Seven-Point Likert Scale with 7 corresponding  
to the most difficult) 
Survey Responses (1 through 7 Likert Scale)
Statistic/Level Daylight Restricted 17 21 Take Leave LPU‐32 HESP
Median 2 3 2 4 4 1 2 5
Mean 2.16 3.44 2.35 3.95 3.71 1.75 2.38 4.58
SD 1.18 1.56 1.18 1.67 1.27 0.99 1.01 1.32
N 25 25 20 20 24 24 24 24
 
 
In the second set of questions, whose results are provided in Table 29, 
subjects chose which level seemed more difficult, if at all. Response A refers to 
the first level, while response B refers to the second level. For instance, A refers 
to Daylight and B to Restricted in the Daylight or Restricted Column. Although 
Route had five responses, the subjects responded with only Route 3 and Route 
4. The individual questions only compare the level within a specific factor. The 
responses to these questions are consistent with the rest of the Egress Study. Of 
note, Subjects 17 and 21 said Route 4 (Starboard Cargo Hatch only) felt more 
difficult because the responsibility to open the hatch fell upon them based on 
seating arrangement. 
Table 29. Summary Statistics Comparing Two Levels (A and B) of Each 











A 0 0 0 1 0 23 (Route3)
B 17 15 22 22 18 2 (Route4)
Same 8 5 3 2 7 N/A





As stated previously, the purpose of the present study was to provide the 
Marine Corps with baseline information concerning the amount of time needed to 
egress from an AAV under various conditions. Those conditions were dictated by 
the sponsors of the study. The data were collected in a nearly ideal setting. For 
example, the AAVs were in a large maintenance bay rather than in a body of 
water. And, every precaution was taken to ensure the safety of the Marines who 
served as research subjects This chapter will discuss the implications of the data 
analysis presented in the previous chapter. The findings of this study can then be 
compared to future studies that would investigate egressing from the current AAV 
in more realistic conditions, the upgraded AAV, and the new ACV. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
The first question asked, “What factors provide Marines in a sinking AAV 
the best chance for survival?” There were several factors and combinations of 
factors that were found to be significant. Each of these will be discussed briefly. 
1. Illumination 
As expected, the data revealed that Marines were able to egress from the 
AAV faster during daylight conditions than under restricted illumination. Although 
the difference was statistically significant, the mean times were less than four 
seconds apart (daylight = 96.90 sec; restricted = 100.65 sec). Illumination levels 
in the maintenance bay during the restricted condition registered as high as 98%. 
The illumination provided by the AAV interior lighting and the spotlight on top 
(which was used because it complied with the SOP) appeared to be sufficient to 
allow Marines to egress relatively quickly.  
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2. Passengers 
It was not surprising to learn that it took significantly longer to egress from 
the vehicle when there were 21 (versus 17) embarked infantry in the back of the 
AAV. The four additional Marines took an average of 20 seconds longer to 
egress. Adding four infantry passengers and their equipment resulted in all 
embarked Marines being more cramped and having a more difficult time 
egressing the vehicle due to the greater amount of flotsam that had to be 
negotiated to get to a hatch.    
3. Armor||PFD 
The combinations of armor (drop in place or keep it on) and personal 
floatation device (LPU-32 or HESP) yielded just three conditions because the 
relevant SOP states that body armor is not removed when wearing the HESP. Of 
the three conditions, the fastest egress times were achieved when the body 
armor was removed and the LPU-32 was worn. On average, it took 20 seconds 
longer to egress when the body armor was worn with the LPU-32 and 30 
seconds longer when the body armor was worn with the HESP. It should be 
noted that mean times in all three conditions were higher than the median times 
due to outlier trials when snags occurred. There were more snags (hence, more 
outliers and slower exit times) when the body armor was worn. Retaining the 
body armor provides personal protection after leaving the vehicle but impedes 
the ability to egress from the vehicle because it adds weight, decreases mobility, 
and increases the likelihood of snags.  
4. Weapon||Route 
There were six conditions that resulted from combining the factors of 
weapon and route. These conditions were also driven by SOP. In a slow-sink 
scenario, Marines are taught to take their weapons when they egress from the 
AAV. But, in a fast-sink scenario, they are instructed to leave their weapons. 
Further, in a slow-sink scenario, the SOP states that only one cargo hatch should 
be opened but in a fast-sink scenario both cargo hatches can be used. The 
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resulting six conditions were: Take (weapon) 1 (hatch); Take3; Take4; Leave2, 
Leave3; and, Leave 5. 
As expected, the fastest egress times occurred when Marines left their 
weapons and used all five hatches (mean = 42.08 sec). It took them more than 
four times longer to egress from the vehicle when they took their weapons and 
used three hatches. The next slowest egress time occurred when the Marines left 
their weapons and used three hatches.  
The three-hatch conditions are misnomers. The hatches used in this 
condition are at the front of the vehicle and designated for the driver, the troop 
commander, and the crew chief. They are much smaller than the two cargo 
hatches in the rear of the vehicle. Of the three forward hatches, only the troop 
commander hatch is a viable option for the embarked infantry. The driver’s hatch 
requires the Marines to negotiate a passageway no more than 12 inches wide. 
The crew chief hatch has a turret cage that must be climbed into before exiting 
through the hatch. Both of these hatches are nearly impossible to negotiate when 
wearing body armor and carrying a weapon. Consequently, only the driver and 
the crew chief used their respective hatches. All other Marines in the vehicle 
egressed through the troop commander’s hatch in the three-hatch conditions. 
5. Replication Order 
The study consisted of 72 unique trials; each trial was conducted three 
times. The intent of the researchers was to randomize each set of 72 trials and to 
finish all trials in the first set prior to moving on to the second and third sets. 
However, a completely randomized trial set would have taken too long to finish 
because of the transitions required between certain trials. For example, each 
time the experimental plan called for a restricted illumination following a daylight 
trial, a 15–20 minute pause was taken so that the subjects’ eyes could adjust to 
the lighting condition. Therefore trials were blocked in a manner that increased 
the efficiency of study but resulted in some trials in the 2nd and 3rd sets being 
conducted before all of the trials in the first set were completed. 
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The analysis indicated that, in general, egress times improved from the 
first trial set to the third trial set. This finding, coupled with the survey results and 
the observations of the researchers, suggest that the Marines were learning 
throughout the eight days of experimentation. Another factor that may have 
contributed to improved performance in subsequent trial sets is improved 
teamwork. 
6. Illumination x Passengers 
The analysis revealed a significant interaction between Illumination and 
Passengers. The egress times during the daylight illumination condition for both 
17 and 21 passengers were consistent. However, the egress times with 17 
passengers in the restricted illumination condition were faster than the daylight 
condition for either the 17 or 21 passengers. Further, the egress times with 21 
passengers in the restricted illumination condition were slower than the daylight 
condition for either the 17 or 21 passengers. The explanation for this interaction 
is not immediately apparent and calls for further analysis. One possibility is that 
there were more snags in the trials with 21 passengers in the restricted 
illumination condition. Trials in which passengers became snagged resulted in 
slower egress times. 
7. Weapon||Route x Armor||PFD 
This significant interaction indicates that egress times are fastest when 
passengers left their weapons and were able to use the two rear cargo hatches. 
When they were able to use all five hatches and left their weapons, egress times 
were unaffected by whether they dropped or wore their body armor and the type 
of PFD they used. However, when they used just the two cargo hatches, wearing 
the body armor appeared to slow the egress times more than when they 
removed it. 
As stated previously, the three-hatch conditions (which, in reality, use only 
the troop commander’s hatch) result in the slowest egress times. Taking 
weapons slowed egress times even more. And, wearing body armor and taking 
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weapons resulted in the slowest egress times. These results need to be 
compared with egress SOPs, training, and doctrine to ensure the Marine Corps is 
not teaching and enforcing egress procedures that could unnecessarily impede 
the safe exit from a disabled AAV.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
The second question asked, “Is the design of experiment appropriate 
given the safety constraints?” The short answer is “yes.” The researchers took 
into consideration the factors the sponsors wanted to examine, the safety 
constraints imposed on the study, and the Marine Corps SOPs and training 
manuals that addressed egress from an AAV. The result was a full factorial 
design, which resulted in 72 unique trials, each of which was completed three 
times for a total of 216 trials over just an eight-day period. This research would 
not have been possible without the highly motivated Marines who volunteered to 
participate in the study. 
These experimental results provide a baseline for all future egress studies 
because they were performed under near optimal conditions. It is highly unlikely 
that Marines would be able to egress from a damaged AAV on land or sea faster 
than the subjects in this study. Therefore, the results of this study should not be 
used to guide design or doctrine. Instead, we advocate considering some of the 
factors that were not present in this study that would have a significant impact on 
egress from an AAV. 
 Vehicle orientation (and Marine Disorientation)–Is the vehicle nose 
up or down? Is the vehicle on its side or upside down? 
 Injuries–Are any Marines injured? If so, how many and how badly? 
 Land or Sea–If on land, Marines may have to climb down from the 
top of the AAV, which will take additional time. If at sea, is there 
another AAV nearby to assist with egress? Is the AAV taking on 
water? How fast? Even a little water will impede egress 
significantly. 
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 Anthropometry–Will all Marines fit through all hatches when 
wearing body armor and carrying a weapon? AAVs were built over 
forty years ago when Marines were smaller in stature and girth and 
carried much less equipment. In this study, the two largest Marines 
became snagged frequently. On multiple occasions, a HESP 
inflated and the Marine became lodged in the hatch. He could not 
go up or down, effectively trapping everyone behind him. 
 Lung Capacity–How long can a Marine hold his or her breath? The 
egress times in this study ranged from approximately 30 seconds to 
more than six minutes. If a vehicle has taken on water a HESP only 
provides a few breaths of air–not enough to sustain most people for 
six minutes. 
 Stress–Are the Marines taking fire? A damaged vehicle in a hostile 
environment will raise stress levels, which will result in the 
production of adrenalin. This will help Marines respond to the 
situation but, in a sinking AAV, it will lead to faster energy 
expenditure.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION THREE 
The third research question asks, “Does the current SOP establish the 
conditions that will optimize survivability of the subjects and their equipment 
during waterborne operations?” This question can be answered by comparing the 
results of this study to the Marine Corps SOPs that address egress procedures. 
Assault Amphibian School Battalion Order (BNO) P3000.1H is the most recent 
published common SOP.  
Appendix J of the SOP describes the embarked troop brief (ETB) to be 
given by the vehicle commander. The ETB is a one-page script that is to be read 
by the vehicle commander prior to waterborne operations. The script states that 
each passenger must adhere to the crew’s instructions during operations and 
that understanding the emergency procedures is incumbent on each individual. 
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The instruction is proved to increase subject awareness and reduce confusion 
and minimize egress time. The script also requires passengers to familiarize 
themselves with the pocket sized ETB. However, the SOP only requires one 
copy per AAV.  
The ETB describes the conditions of both the rapid and slow sink 
scenarios. The responsibility to determine which scenario is unfolding falls to the 
vehicle commander at which time he commands either “Egress, Egress, Egress” 
or “Evac, Evac, Evac,” which is then echoed by the third crewman. The potential 
problem with the commands is that both sound similar and evoke the need to exit 
the vehicle rapidly regardless of the actual situation.  
In a slow sink scenario, crew and passengers should gather their 
equipment and transfer to the recovery vehicle in an orderly manner. However, 
the SOP makes no mention whether the vehicle commander has the discretion to 
order the passengers to drop their body armor and leave weapons if he believes 
the amount of water entering the vehicle may change the situation to a rapid sink 
scenario.  
The ETB does not mention dropping body armor during rapid sink 
scenarios. As seen in this study, while designated personnel open the cargo 
hatches, remaining personnel could drop their body armor, which would reduce 
the possibility of snags, decrease the profile of each individual and lower egress 
times. The ETB also only mentions egress through the cargo hatches. In recent 
incidents involving sinking AAVs, subjects egressed from either the forward 
hatches or the troop hatch located in the ramp (see Appendix H for picture). 
Post-experiment surveys revealed difficulty opening the cargo hatches on several 
trials. There was nothing mechanically wrong with the hatches. They simply are 
heavy and require a relatively tall person to exert considerable force in an 
upward direction. These cargo hatches would undoubtedly become more 
cumbersome in rough seas or with a pitched vehicle. The Marine Corps should 
consider modifying the EBT to include multiple alternate egress routes during an 
emergency.  
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In this study, the SOP’s guidance for load planning was followed closely 
throughout the experiment. Figure 38 gives the position for passengers’ packs 
inside the troop compartment.  
 
 
Figure 38. Load Plan for AAV during waterborne operations 
Post-experiment surveys indicated that the packs provided additional 
footing while egressing through the cargo hatches. However, when passengers 
had to egress through the forward hatches, the packs became obstacles and 
snag points. Further, when a vehicle begins to sink it will dive nose first. If the 
packs were to become unsecured, it would further restrict passengers from 
moving forward or the driver, troop commander, and vehicle commander from 
moving to the rear should any individual hatch become inoperable. With no 
alternative location to stow the packs, it is crucial that the packs are secured 
tightly and their profile is reduced as much as possible. The ETB emphasize the 
importance of proper gear storage as it relates to egress.  
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In summary, the SOP provides the basic information on emergency 
egress procedures. However, additional information should be added for both the 
vehicle commander and the passengers so they fully understand what to do 
across the full spectrum of emergency egress scenarios. The final chapter of this 
thesis will provide conclusions and propose recommendations for further 
research. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The present study afforded researchers a rare opportunity to conduct a full 
factorial experiment under controlled conditions with highly motivated subjects 
who are representative of the target population. As reported in the previous 
chapter, several of the factors proved to be statistically significant. However, the 
results must be considered within the context and manner in which the data were 
collected. The experiment was conducted in a safe, administrative setting rather 
than a potentially dangerous field or waterborne environment. Even so, we 
believe many of these findings to have practical and militarily important 
implications.  
 The more Marines put into the back of the AAV, the longer it will 
take for them to egress from the vehicle. The increase in time is 
due not only to the number of personnel but also to their 
equipment. The more tightly the Marines are crammed into the 
AAV, the less room each will have to maneuver. 
 Wearing body armor will increase egress times.  
 Taking weapons will increase egress times. 
 Marines at the 95th percentile for girth-type measurements (e.g., 
chest circumference, shoulder circumference, bideltoid breadth) are 
more likely to become snagged and, as a result, delay or prevent 
the egress of those Marines behind them. 
 Wearing the LPU-41/SRU-43 HESP will increase the likelihood of 
becoming snagged during egress (because it is worn over body 
armor). 
 Using the driver’s hatch and the crew chief’s hatch to egress from 
the AAV is not viable (except for the driver and crew chief).  
Time is critical when Marines are egressing under emergency conditions 
(e.g., the AAV is sinking or under fire). Seconds matter. Any delay could result in 
the death of a Marine. Every consideration should be given to the findings of this 
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study; they should be applied to the re-design of the AAV, the design of the 
forthcoming ACV, and the SOPs that describe the procedures Marines will use 
when they egress.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Marine Corps plays a vital role in national security. That role is likely 
to expand as the U.S. national security policy places greater emphasis in the 
Pacific Theater. The Marines will continue to need a viable vehicle to transport 
personnel and equipment from ship to an opposed shore and then to continue 
the fight inland. A well-designed vehicle will, among other things, facilitate safe 
and swift egress during emergencies. The findings of this study suggest several 
areas for additional research and other activities that could improve egress. 
Additional studies should be undertaken in operational (rather than 
administrative) settings. While such studies increase the risk to research 
subjects, they will more closely approximate the actual conditions Marines would 
face in combat. These additional studies should be conducted both on land and 
in water. They should include conditions in which the vehicle is oriented in 
attitudes representative of tactical situations. The Marine Corps should also 
consider altering its selection criteria for infantry who will be transported in 
amphibious vehicles. Marines who exceed the 95th percentile pose a danger to 
themselves and others during egress. Alternatively, designers of future vehicles 
must consider the relevant anthropometric measures of the entire infantry 
population and build a vehicle in which egress is not impeded for Marines of any 
size. Finally, SOPs should be carefully examined (and revised if necessary) in 
light of this study to ensure they set the conditions for swift and safe egress. 
Issues to consider include: when weapons and armor should be taken or 
dropped; what personal floatation device should be used and how it should be 
worn; and, which hatches should be used and which should be avoided. 
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APPENDIX A.  AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS  
- LHA/LHD/LHA(R) 
Description 
The largest of all amphibious warfare ships; resembles a small aircraft 
carrier; capable of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL), Short Take-Off 
Vertical Landing (STOVL), Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor and 
Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft operations; contains a well deck to support use of 
Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) and other watercraft (with exception of the 
first two LHA(R) class ships, LHA 6 and LHA 7, which have no well deck). LHA 8 
will feature a well deck. 
 
General Characteristics, LHA(R) Class LHA (6) 
Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Miss. 
Date Deployed: Scheduled for delivery to the fleet in 2013. 
Propulsion: Two marine gas turbines, two shafts, 70,000 total brake horsepower, 
two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors. 
Length: 844 feet (257.3 meters). 
Beam: 106 feet (32.3 meters). 
Displacement: Approximately 44,971 long tons full load (45,695 metric tons). 
Speed: 20+ knots. 
Crew: 1,059 (65 officers)  
Load: 1,687 troops (plus 184 surge). 
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers (with 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)); two 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; seven 
twin .50 cal. machine guns. 
Aircraft: A mix of: F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) STOVL aircraft; MV-22 
Osprey VTOL tiltrotors; CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; UH-1Y Huey 
helicopters; AH-1Z Super Cobra helicopters; MH-60S Seahawk helicopters. 
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Homeport: PCU America (LHA 6), No homeport - under construction; PCU Tripoli 
(LHA 7), No homeport, under construction. 
Ships: 
PCU America (LHA6), No homeport - Under Construction 
  
General Characteristics, Wasp Class 
Builder: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, MS. 
Date Deployed: July 29, 1989 (USS Wasp) 
Propulsion: (LHDs 17) two boilers, two geared steam turbines, two shafts, 70,000 
total brake horsepower; (LHD 8) two gas turbines, two shafts; 70,000 total shaft 
horsepower, two 5,000 horsepower auxiliary propulsion motors. 
Length: 844 feet (253.2 meters). 
Beam: 106 feet (31.8 meters). 
Displacement: LHDs 1-4: 40,650 tons full load (41,302.3 metric tons) 
LHDs 5-7: 40,358 tons full load (41,005.6 metric tons) 
LHD 8: 41,772 tons full load (42,442.3 metric tons). 
Speed: 20+ knots (23.5+ miles per hour). 
Crew: Ships Company: 66 officers, 1,004 enlisted 
LHD 8: 65 officers, 994 enlisted 
Marine Detachment: 1,687 troops (plus 184 surge). 
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two NATO Sea Sparrow launchers; three 20mm 
Phalanx CIWS mounts (two on LHD 5-8); four .50 cal. machine guns; four 25 mm 
Mk 38 machine guns (LHD 5-8 have three 25 mm Mk 38 machine guns). 
Aircraft: 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; 6 
AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft; 3 UH-1N Huey helicopters; 4 AH-1W Super Cobra 
helicopters. (planned capability to embark MV-22 Osprey VTOL tilt-rotors). 
Landing/Attack Craft: 3 LCACs or 2 LCUs. 
Ships: 
USS Wasp (LHD 1), Norfolk, VA 
USS Essex (LHD 2), Sasebo, Japan 
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), Norfolk, VA 
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USS Boxer (LHD 4), San Diego, CA 
USS Bataan (LHD 5), Norfolk, VA 
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), San Diego, CA 
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), Norfolk, VA 
USS Makin Island (LHD 8), San Diego, CA 
 
General Characteristics, Tarawa Class 
Builder: Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, MS. 
Date Deployed: May 29, 1976 (USS Tarawa) 
Propulsion: Two boilers, two geared steam turbines, two shafts, 70,000 total 
shaft horsepower. 
Length: 820 feet (249.9 meters). 
Beam: 106 feet (31.8 meters). 
Displacement: 39,400 tons (40,032 metric tons) full load. 
Speed: 24 knots (27.6 miles per hour). 
Crew: Ships Company: 82 officers, 882 enlisted 
Marine Detachment 1,900 plus. 
Armament: Two RAM launchers; two Phalanx 20 mm CIWS mount; three .50 cal. 
machine guns; four 25 mm Mk 38 machine guns. 
Aircraft: 12 CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters; 6 
AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft; 3 UH-1N Huey helicopters; 4 AH-1W Super Cobra 
helicopters. 
Landing/Attack Craft: 4 LCUs or 2 LCUs and 1 LCAC. 
Ships: 
USS Nassau (LHA 4), Norfolk, VA 
USS Peleliu (LHA 5), San Diego, CA 
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APPENDIX B.  SEA STATES 
Table 30. Annual Sea State Occurrences in the Open Ocean North Pacific 









Table 31. Annual Sea State Occurrences in the Open Ocean Northern 




APPENDIX C.  AAV DIMENSIONS 
Table 32. AAV Dimensions 1971 
FMC Corp. LVTP7, 1971
Crew (28 men) Dimensions Performance
Commander in weapon station Weight: 50,350lbs/22,840Kg Road Speed: 40mph/64kph
Driver in hull left front Height: 128.5in/326.4cm Water Speed: 8.4mph/14kph
Assistant driver in hull left center Length: 312.75in/794.39cm Land Range: 300mi/480km
Troop commander in hull left front Width: 128.72in/326.95cm Water Range: 56mi/90km
24 combat loaded passengers
 
(from: American Fighting Vehicle Database, 2013) 
Table 33. AAV Dimensions 1983 
FMC Corp. AAVP7A1, 1983
Crew (28 men) Dimensions Performance
Commander in weapon station Weight: 56,552lbs/25,652kg Road Speed: 45mph/72kph
Driver in hull left front Height: 130.5in/331.5cm Water Speed: 8.2mph/13kph
Assistant driver in hull left center Length: 321.3in/816.1cm Land Range: 300mi/480km
Troop commander in hull left front Width: 128.72in/326.95cm Water Range: 56mi/90km
24 combat loaded passengers
 
(from: American Fighting Vehicle Database, 2013) 
Table 34. AAV Dimensions 1995 - Present 
United Defense Limited Partnership Corp. AAVP7A1 (RAM/RS), 1995
Crew (24 men) Dimensions Performance
Commander in weapon station Weight: 58,105lbs/26,356kg Road Speed: 45mph/72kph
Driver in hull left front Height: 130.5in/331.5cm Water Speed: 8.2mph/13kph
Assistant driver in hull left center Length: 321.3in/816.1cm Land Range: 300mi/480km
Troop commander in hull left front Width: 130.6in/331.72cm Water Range: 56mi/90km
20 combat loaded passengers 
 
(from: MCWP 3-13, 2005) 
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APPENDIX D.  AVERAGE ANTHROPOMETRIC MEASUREMENTS 
Table 35. Average Anthropometric Measurements (NPS Experiment Team, 











































































































































































































































1 173.30 166.33 116.55 98.15 82.60 101.90 22.85 47.50 176.20 174.00 120.00 100.10 89.15 103.80 23.00 47.50 180.20 196.33 128.45 117.30 108.60 103.35 32.65 51.55
2 174.73 200.58 126.00 103.90 89.50 114.00 23.95 49.90 180.33 211.00 128.95 107.15 100.10 119.30 24.90 49.90 184.53 234.58 133.55 126.45 115.15 119.90 34.90 53.25
3 176.70 190.00 124.10 102.50 91.50 105.70 22.75 50.20 180.40 197.00 126.55 102.70 96.70 108.25 23.10 50.20 185.63 221.00 135.00 121.35 113.60 109.00 33.60 50.40
4 164.23 169.67 124.50 103.95 87.20 98.30 24.70 55.60 167.40 178.08 131.40 105.70 88.65 103.35 24.65 55.60 171.27 214.08 137.25 126.75 143.50 104.15 39.55 58.50
5 182.10 184.67 122.00 102.25 77.65 102.20 22.75 51.25 185.63 192.75 125.15 101.90 82.00 109.80 23.10 51.25 188.20 228.00 188.85 136.00 131.45 112.05 43.00 55.80
6 177.23 228.25 142.05 123.95 103.10 115.25 27.60 59.25 180.23 237.42 145.90 124.00 105.95 121.25 28.50 59.25 184.03 278.33 158.25 147.25 165.00 121.70 49.30 60.25
7 175.73 155.75 108.20 94.55 79.35 94.70 21.35 45.65 179.67 165.67 115.95 96.05 79.90 103.25 21.40 45.65 184.10 201.00 128.60 120.40 134.25 108.75 43.70 50.55
8 182.33 148.83 110.20 92.05 76.70 97.85 21.15 46.55 186.20 158.00 114.05 91.00 79.50 102.90 21.15 46.55 189.87 197.75 128.10 115.15 151.75 106.60 42.70 49.90
9 161.63 140.00 113.45 97.80 82.25 96.55 24.50 46.65 165.20 149.75 118.65 102.75 87.70 103.50 25.05 46.65 168.00 190.83 134.00 123.10 137.35 104.25 40.80 49.25
10 163.37 139.58 107.90 94.70 80.05 94.10 23.20 43.30 167.33 145.50 109.70 97.05 86.15 103.50 23.30 43.30 171.23 184.83 128.65 137.95 143.00 106.50 40.85 48.00
11 177.83 171.42 124.55 105.75 78.30 99.70 23.45 53.65 180.97 181.50 128.80 107.00 80.00 106.30 23.15 53.65 184.73 220.00 143.65 133.50 147.90 112.80 45.45 56.45
12 174.90 187.83 122.25 106.90 89.60 101.35 26.50 49.30 180.33 197.50 128.85 109.00 96.25 107.00 26.45 49.30 184.50 237.92 141.40 130.25 157.00 110.25 44.60 55.75
13 172.07 162.00 114.70 93.50 78.60 99.50 22.10 48.00 175.43 171.00 119.90 96.80 83.00 105.45 23.15 48.00 177.90 203.42 126.25 122.65 145.85 106.50 40.50 52.75
14 165.43 148.92 117.15 91.15 77.55 91.75 22.15 48.10 169.63 157.00 119.35 93.50 81.00 98.75 21.35 48.10 173.27 190.92 133.75 124.30 139.25 104.55 38.60 51.25
15 163.40 155.25 115.90 94.95 82.45 99.70 21.85 48.95 166.20 162.58 120.65 98.75 85.60 105.65 22.35 48.95 170.27 200.50 135.00 126.25 130.90 111.50 44.65 52.15
16 179.00 196.33 125.15 103.75 85.55 105.15 24.80 51.65 182.97 206.00 126.85 102.50 90.25 114.25 25.65 51.65 187.00 242.67 142.00 126.65 146.35 117.15 38.35 54.50
17 172.67 173.33 126.30 100.35 80.05 99.20 24.20 52.85 176.60 181.83 127.75 99.45 84.10 106.35 23.20 52.85 180.60 222.50 144.00 125.85 150.85 113.95 47.05 55.00
18 173.40 172.42 118.10 97.60 78.20 97.00 23.00 48.25 178.90 183.75 121.15 101.05 81.55 105.50 23.35 48.25 182.07 224.25 136.05 132.60 139.25 107.45 41.75 52.50
19 170.63 160.50 113.65 95.75 81.50 99.20 22.90 47.75 176.37 170.75 119.00 97.95 84.40 106.45 22.85 47.75 178.37 210.17 133.25 124.25 141.80 109.85 41.25 52.75
20 175.63 239.42 131.90 123.95 106.70 115.25 28.35 55.75 179.20 249.00 152.75 122.40 110.00 122.35 29.60 55.75 183.53 292.00 144.50 143.85 157.10 124.00 47.85 60.10
21 168.00 183.25 125.10 109.20 84.30 100.65 25.90 53.00 169.37 190.33 130.30 109.30 89.60 108.55 26.65 53.00 173.77 222.83 135.25 130.80 142.50 108.05 47.80 56.35
22 178.53 187.32 117.25 99.80 84.10 101.00 23.85 49.35 181.13 193.67 121.05 102.10 90.10 109.10 24.40 49.35 186.40 236.25 136.40 128.35 135.10 113.25 44.70 51.85
23 164.73 147.25 115.35 95.70 76.70 96.60 24.05 47.35 167.53 156.67 120.65 96.25 79.15 105.05 23.95 47.35 171.50 193.25 131.00 118.50 140.60 105.00 38.85 50.85
24 183.03 179.83 118.90 103.00 84.85 105.60 24.60 48.10 186.80 189.50 124.40 103.60 86.75 110.45 24.30 48.10 190.40 226.00 142.25 136.60 139.90 110.80 41.80 53.10
25 175.20 164.92 121.45 101.40 77.65 99.05 23.35 50.30 179.40 172.67 125.95 104.25 82.00 102.90 24.05 50.30 181.93 215.42 137.45 130.30 142.00 109.90 47.40 52.30
26 183.40 175.00 117.00 98.20 84.00 100.85 23.95 50.25 188.30 184.50 123.95 100.60 85.05 110.00 23.30 50.25 190.30 226.08 134.15 136.70 149.45 112.60 38.15 52.00  
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APPENDIX E.  EQUIPMENT LIST 
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APPENDIX F.  ATTACHED RUN MATRIX 
6‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:00 Load Buses Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:00 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
8:00 In‐brief All Hands AVTB Test Site
8:30 Collect data All Hands AVTB Test Site Station Rotaion
Familiarization I Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
10:00 Day 17 E1 L5
10:12 Day 17 E2 L3
10:24 Day 17 E3 L2
10:36 Day 21 E1 T4
10:48 Day 21 E2 T3




Familiarization II Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 Night 17 E1 T4
13:15 Night 17 E2 T3
13:30 Night 17 E3 T1
13:45 Night 21 E1 L5
14:00 Night 21 E2 L3
14:15 Night 21 E3 L2
14:30 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of
14:50 Return Weapons Participants 3d AAV Bn Armory last run
14:50 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site














Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 1 Day 17 E3 L5
8:12 2 Day 17 E1 L2
8:24 3 Day 17 E2 L2
8:36 4 Day 17 E2 T4
8:48 5 Day 17 E3 T3
9:00 Break
9:10 6 Day 17 E2 L3
9:22 7 Day 17 E1 L5
9:34 8 Day 17 E2 L5
9:46 9 Day 17 E2 T1
9:58 10 Day 17 E3 T1
10:10 Break
10:20 11 Day 17 E2 T3
10:32 12 Day 17 E1 L3
10:44 13 Day 17 E3 T4




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 15 Night 21 E3 L5
13:12 16 Night 21 E1 L2
13:24 17 Night 21 E2 L2
13:36 18 Night 21 E2 T4
13:48 19 Night 21 E3 T3
14:00 Break
14:10 20 Night 21 E2 L3
14:22 21 Night 21 E1 L5
14:34 22 Night 21 E2 L5
14:46 23 Night 21 E2 T1
14:58 24 Night 21 E3 T1
15:08 Break
15:20 25 Night 21 E2 T3
15:32 26 Night 21 E1 L3
15:44 27 Night 21 E3 T4
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
 105
 8‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 28 Night 21 E3 L2
8:12 29 Night 21 E1 T1
8:24 30 Night 21 E3 L3
8:36 31 Night 21 E1 T4
8:48 32 Night 21 E1 T3
9:00 Break
9:10 33 Night 21 E3 L5
9:22 34 Night 21 E1 L2
9:34 35 Night 21 E2 L2
9:46 36 Night 21 E2 T4
9:58 37 Night 21 E3 T3
10:10 Break
10:20 38 Night 21 E2 L3
10:32 39 Night 21 E1 L5
10:44 40 Night 21 E2 L5




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 42 Day 17 E1 T1
13:12 43 Day 17 E3 L3
13:24 44 Day 17 E1 T4
13:36 45 Day 17 E1 T3
13:48 46 Day 17 E3 L5
14:00 Break
14:10 47 Day 17 E1 L2
14:22 48 Day 17 E2 L2
14:34 49 Day 17 E2 T4
14:46 50 Day 17 E3 T3
14:58 51 Day 17 E2 L3
15:08 Break
15:20 52 Day 17 E1 L5
15:32 53 Day 17 E2 L5
15:44 54 Day 17 E2 T1
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 9‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 55 Day 21 E3 L5
8:12 56 Day 21 E1 L2
8:24 57 Day 21 E2 L2
8:36 58 Day 21 E2 T4
8:48 59 Day 21 E3 T3
9:00 Break
9:10 60 Day 21 E2 L3
9:22 61 Day 21 E1 L5
9:34 62 Day 21 E2 L5
9:46 63 Day 21 E2 T1
9:58 64 Day 21 E3 T1
10:10 Break
10:20 65 Day 21 E2 T3
10:32 66 Day 21 E1 L3
10:44 67 Day 21 E3 T4




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 69 Night 17 E3 L5
13:12 70 Night 17 E1 L2
13:24 71 Night 17 E2 L2
13:36 72 Night 17 E2 T4
13:48 73 Night 17 E3 T3
14:00 Break
14:10 74 Night 17 E2 L3
14:22 75 Night 17 E1 L5
14:34 76 Night 17 E2 L5
14:46 77 Night 17 E2 T1
14:58 78 Night 17 E3 T1
15:08 Break
15:20 79 Night 17 E2 T3
15:32 80 Night 17 E1 L3
15:44 81 Night 17 E3 T4
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 10‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 82 Night 17 E3 L2
8:12 83 Night 17 E1 T1
8:24 84 Night 17 E3 L3
8:36 85 Night 17 E1 T4
8:48 86 Night 17 E1 T3
9:00 Break
9:10 87 Night 17 E3 L5
9:22 88 Night 17 E1 L2
9:34 89 Night 17 E2 L2
9:46 90 Night 17 E2 T4
9:58 91 Night 17 E3 T3
10:10 Break
10:20 92 Night 17 E2 L3
10:32 93 Night 17 E1 L5
10:44 94 Night 17 E2 L5




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 96 Day 21 E1 T1
13:12 97 Day 21 E3 L3
13:24 98 Day 21 E1 T4
13:36 99 Day 21 E1 T3
13:48 100 Day 21 E3 L5
14:00 Break
14:10 101 Day 21 E1 L2
14:22 102 Day 21 E2 L2
14:34 103 Day 21 E2 T4
14:46 104 Day 21 E3 T3
14:58 105 Day 21 E2 L3
15:08 Break
15:20 106 Day 21 E1 L5
15:32 107 Day 21 E2 L5
15:44 108 Day 21 E2 T1
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 13‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 109 Day 17 E3 T1
8:12 110 Day 17 E2 T3
8:24 111 Day 17 E1 L3
8:36 112 Day 17 E3 T4
8:48 113 Day 17 E3 L2
9:00 Break
9:10 114 Day 17 E1 T1
9:22 115 Day 17 E3 L3
9:34 116 Day 17 E1 T4
9:46 117 Day 17 E1 T3
9:58 118 Day 17 E3 L5
10:10 Break
10:20 119 Day 17 E1 L2
10:32 120 Day 17 E2 L2
10:44 121 Day 17 E2 T4




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 123 Night 21 E3 T1
13:12 124 Night 21 E2 T3
13:24 125 Night 21 E1 L3
13:36 126 Night 21 E3 T4
13:48 127 Night 21 E3 L2
14:00 Break
14:10 128 Night 21 E1 T1
14:22 129 Night 21 E3 L3
14:34 130 Night 21 E1 T4
14:46 131 Night 21 E1 T3
14:58 132 Night 21 E3 L5
15:08 Break
15:20 133 Night 21 E1 L2
15:32 134 Night 21 E2 L2
15:44 135 Night 21 E2 T4
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 14‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 136 Night 21 E3 T3
8:12 137 Night 21 E2 L3
8:24 138 Night 21 E1 L5
8:36 139 Night 21 E2 L5
8:48 140 Night 21 E2 T1
9:00 Break
9:10 141 Night 21 E3 T1
9:22 142 Night 21 E2 T3
9:34 143 Night 21 E1 L3
9:46 144 Night 21 E3 T4
9:58 145 Night 21 E3 L2
10:10 Break
10:20 146 Night 21 E1 T1
10:32 147 Night 21 E3 L3
10:44 148 Night 21 E1 T4




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 150 Day 17 E2 L3
13:12 151 Day 17 E1 L5
13:24 152 Day 17 E2 L5
13:36 153 Day 17 E2 T1
13:48 154 Day 17 E3 T1
14:00 Break
14:10 155 Day 17 E2 T3
14:22 156 Day 17 E1 L3
14:34 157 Day 17 E3 T4
14:46 158 Day 17 E3 L2
14:58 159 Day 17 E1 T1
15:08 Break
15:20 160 Day 17 E3 L3
15:32 161 Day 17 E1 T4
15:44 162 Day 17 E1 T3
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 15‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 163 Day 21 E3 T1
8:12 164 Day 21 E2 T3
8:24 165 Day 21 E1 L3
8:36 166 Day 21 E3 T4
8:48 167 Day 21 E3 L2
9:00 Break
9:10 168 Day 21 E1 T1
9:22 169 Day 21 E3 L3
9:34 170 Day 21 E1 T4
9:46 171 Day 21 E1 T3
9:58 172 Day 21 E3 L5
10:10 Break
10:20 173 Day 21 E1 L2
10:32 174 Day 21 E2 L2
10:44 175 Day 21 E2 T4




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 177 Night 17 E3 T1
13:12 178 Night 17 E2 T3
13:24 179 Night 17 E1 L3
13:36 180 Night 17 E3 T4
13:48 181 Night 17 E3 L2
14:00 Break
14:10 182 Night 17 E1 T1
14:22 183 Night 17 E3 L3
14:34 184 Night 17 E1 T4
14:46 185 Night 17 E1 T3
14:58 186 Night 17 E3 L5
15:08 Break
15:20 187 Night 17 E1 L2
15:32 188 Night 17 E2 L2
15:44 189 Night 17 E2 T4
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 16‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:15 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site Safety Brief
BLOCK I Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
8:00 190 Night 17 E3 T3
8:12 191 Night 17 E2 L3
8:24 192 Night 17 E1 L5
8:36 193 Night 17 E2 L5
8:48 194 Night 17 E2 T1
9:00 Break
9:10 195 Night 17 E3 T1
9:22 196 Night 17 E2 T3
9:34 197 Night 17 E1 L3
9:46 198 Night 17 E3 T4
9:58 199 Night 17 E3 L2
10:10 Break
10:20 200 Night 17 E1 T1
10:32 201 Night 17 E3 L3
10:44 202 Night 17 E1 T4




BLOCK II Run Number Lighting  Embarked  Ensemble Weapon/Route
13:00 204 Day 21 E2 L3
13:12 205 Day 21 E1 L5
13:24 206 Day 21 E2 L5
13:36 207 Day 21 E2 T1
13:48 208 Day 21 E3 T1
14:00 Break
14:10 209 Day 21 E2 T3
14:22 210 Day 21 E1 L3
14:34 211 Day 21 E3 T4
14:46 212 Day 21 E3 L2
14:58 213 Day 21 E1 T1
15:08 Break
15:20 214 Day 21 E3 L3
15:32 215 Day 21 E1 T4
15:44 216 Day 21 E1 T3
15:56 Hotwash All Hands Test Site Will go at conclusion of last run
16:06 Team AAR AVTB/NPS Test Site
16:30 Buses Launch Participants 21 Area  
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 17‐Aug‐12
Time Event Who Where Special Instructions
No scheduled runs
Left open for make up 
5:30 Chow  Participants Camp Horno
6:30 Buses Launch Participants Horno Grinder
7:00 Prep Test Area AVTB/NPS  AVTB Test Site All research personnel on site
7:00 Buses arrive Participants AVTB Test Site
7:30 Morning report Participants AVTB Test Site
8:00 Begin Participants  
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Troop Hatch in ramp 
Figure 39. View of test bay 
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